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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis investigates the motivations behind, the methods used in, and the results of 
the overseas students’ collective action contesting the measures, which the Australian 
government introduced from 1983 to 1996. As a group of temporary residents located 
outside the boundaries of domestic political systems, yet within the core of Australia’s 
revenue earnings, overseas students independently mobilised in an attempt to influence 
the Australian Government policy on education from a position of limited political, 
social and legal rights. As temporary residents on short-term permits fully regulated 
under prescribed immigration rules, overseas students employed conventional 
repertoires of contention— they established formal structures, adopted action tools, 
framed their claims, internationalised their protest, formed alliances — in an attempt to 
mobilise resources and access existing avenues to influence government’s export of 
education services policy. Their mobilisation response and campaign strategy achieved 
modest success in securing some policy concessions, particularly during the early stages 
of education aid reform. Their strategy, however had to evolve as the fledgling export of 
education services expanded and eventually they shifted their position to fully embrace 
and reinterpret the government’s own ‘language of liberalisation’, which they used to 
greater effectiveness in making subsequent claims. Overseas students ability to procure 
concessions is derived not from their political or universal rights to education, but from 
their ability to influence policy changes based on their importance and strategic location 
in the Australian economy. In other words, government, universities and industry 
stakeholders have increasingly become dependent on substantial revenue earnings 
derived from overseas students and have become susceptible to potential chaos that may 
be precipitated if current students withdrew from the economy, or potential students 
choosing alternative education service destinations. 
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One 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In May 1986, a group of overseas students from student organisations across Australia 
gathered at Monash University in Melbourne to discuss a crisis that would have deep 
and far-reaching impact on the present and future education opportunities for overseas 
students in Australia.1 A looming problem had emerged a year before with the Hawke 
Labor government deciding to introduce a new policy to increase overseas students’ 
visa charges. This, together with its subsequent decision to completely overhaul its 
longstanding and highly successful international education aid scheme, the Overseas 
Students Program (OSP), had now precipitated into a serious crisis for the student 
leaders. Following recommendations by the Jackson Committee2, established to review 
the aid program, the government resolved to allow Australian education institutions to 
market their courses and degree programs abroad. This recommendation threatened to 
unleash a deregulated and competitive, demand-driven model of full fees for 
recruitment of foreign students in the higher education sector.3  
For several days the student leaders debated intensely in an attempt to formulate a 
national response to a common concern. It had only been a year previously that the 
                                                
1 National Overseas Students Association, 1986, The 2nd National Overseas Students Conference, 
Monash University, May, Melbourne (unpublished) 
2 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1985, The Jackson Report on Australia’s Overseas Aid 
Program, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra 
3 Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 2000, The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Public 
Universities in Australia, IMHE General Conference of the OECD Paris, September 
 12 
same students had failed to coalesce around a similar plan of action in response to the 
initial fee increase. However, at that time contrasting policy positions had stood in the 
path of compromise, while the disparate geographical locations of overseas student 
organisations posed an impediment to forming a concerted national response to a 
common challenge. This time, the students were determined to avoid another failure to 
mobilise against the government. In an attempt to secure an agreed outcome and make 
some headway in the policy debates, the students finally formed a national coordinating 
body, the National Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in Australia (NLC)4 as a 
vehicle to represent their concerns and conduct actions against the government. 
 
REFORM OF EDUCATION AID IN THE 1980S 
The policy decision to accept full fee paying students seemed inescapable. In the period 
between 1985 and 1994, the share of world trade in the international economy rose 
three times faster than between 1975 and 1985. During the same period global direct 
investment had trebled and the economies of East Asia, growing at over 8 percent, were 
lowering trade barriers and transforming themselves into key global players and 
‘miracle economies’.5 Australia’s economy, largely a product of protectionist policies of 
past decades, was in serious trouble from the mid to late seventies onwards and 
beginning to take its toll on domestic politics. In 1975 for example, Gough Whitlam lost 
the subsequent election for mismanaging the economy and creating unprecedented rates 
of unemployment and inflation. In 1983, Whitlam’s successor, Malcolm Fraser was not 
returned to power, largely due to his ongoing policy straggling in response to a fast 
paced changing global economic environment.6 
                                                
4 The National Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in Australia frequently referred to the acronym 
NLC rather than the NLCOSA. 
5 Amsden, A.H, 1993, Asia’s Industrial Revolution, Dissent, 40 (Summer), pp. 324 – 332; World Bank, The 
East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy, Oxford University Press, New York; and Nasbitt, 
J., 1995, Megatrends Asia: The Eight Asian Megatrends That are Changing the World, Nicholas Braeley 
Publishing, London 
6 Jennett, C., & Stewart, R.G, (eds.), 1990, Hawke and Australian public policy: Consensus and 
restructuring, Macmillan, Melbourne; and Head, B.W., & Patience, A., 1989, From Fraser to Hawke, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 
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The need to reform Australia’s economic structures while responding to the imperatives 
and associated vulnerabilities of a swiftly transforming global economy had never been 
more pressing. Heeding past lessons, the Hawke Labor government sought an 
antithetical policy approach to its prevailing economic predicament. Hawke attempted 
to combine ‘caution with an innovative search for greater economic efficiency and 
political control.’7 In response to a deteriorating economy and increasing pressures of 
globalisation, Hawke and his treasurer, Paul Keating, prosecuted bold reforms to 
deregulate the currency and financial markets, and dismantle the ‘schizophrenic pattern 
of industry assistance’ that had emerged in the mid-1970s.8 
Education aid presented a policy area that not only required drastic revamping, it also 
represented a soft target for deep reform with little political or community backlash. 
Australia’s education aid program was formulated and implemented in 1950 under a 
Commonwealth countries joint initiative, The Colombo Plan. Involving nations such as 
Britain, Canada and Australia, a Commonwealth scholarships and fellowships plan was 
created to help facilitate education and training opportunities for developing countries 
in South and South East Asia. From 1951, the technical cooperation scheme within the 
Colombo Plan became the most favoured part of the broader initiative because it 
generated more ‘economic and social impact’ through training of scholarships students 
at universities, and it created good publicity for sponsoring governments. Under the 
Hawke Government’s rubric of ‘structural efficiency’, ‘public sector reform’ and 
‘deregulation’, underscored by ‘bipartisan political consensus without any electorally 
effective opposition’, the government restructured key parts of this successful overseas 
students program in an attempt to transform it into a lucrative revenue generating 
industry. 
The move to sell university courses abroad not only marked the entry of Australian 
institutions into the global market as suppliers of education services, but also produced 
four significant developments. Firstly it unleashed a deregulated, competitive, market-
                                                
7 Castles, F., 1988, Australian public policy and economic vulnerability, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p.27; 
Kelly, P., 1992, The end of certainty: The story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards 
8 Kelly, P., 1992, The end of certainty: The story of the 1980s, Allen & Unwin, St. Leonards 
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driven model of full fees for foreign student recruitment in the education sector9; 
secondly, tertiary institutions with limited public funding were forced to reform and 
restructure themselves to take up the entrepreneurial challenge of attracting new 
‘consumers’ of education services10; thirdly, it introduced a new commercial vernacular 
into the higher education sector where notions of ‘value for money’ and ‘consumer—
supplier’ contractual relationships between foreign students and educational institutions 
gained credence and normalcy; and finally, it became a precursor to a total overhaul of 
Australia’s higher education sector under Minister John Dawkin’s education reform 
agenda in 1988.11 
In 1986, the Australian Government subsidised 20 000 foreign students, with only 2000 
paying full fees. Within five years only 6000 students were subsidised while 48 000 
paid full fees for their degrees.12 In 1988, Australia’s export of education added $100 
million13 to the economy. In less than four years, its contribution grew to over $1 
billion14. By 1991, six higher education institutions were listed amongst Australia’s top 
500 exporters and in 1992 Monash University earned $40 million from international 
students.15 It would take less than two decades for Australia’s education sector to reach 
$10 billion with over 344 000 overseas students emerging as the second largest services 
                                                
9 Department of Education, Training and Youth Affairs, 2000, The Emergence of Entrepreneurial Public 
Universities in Australia, IMHE General Conference of the OECD Paris, September; Department of 
Employment, Education and Training  
10 Smart, D. & Ang, G., 1993, Exporting Education: From Aid to Trade to Internationalisation? IPA Review, 
Melbourne; Bannikoff, A., 1994, “Exporting Education – The challenge of marketing education: the 
Australian experience”, paper presented to the International Education Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 21 – 
22 June; Harold, R., 1990, Marketing the academy: Aspects of exporting higher education courses, A 
report prepared for the Industry Commission; Hudson, H., 1990, Overseas student policy in Australia 1980 
– 1990, A report prepared for the Industry Commission, Industry Commission, Canberra; Jarrett 
Committee, 1985, Report of the Steering Committee for Efficiency Studies in Universities, Committee of 
Vice-Chancellors and Principals, London; Massaro, V., 1994, “New universities and new concepts – 
planning for the future”, paper presented to the International Education Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 21 – 
22 June 
11 Dawkins, J.S., 1988, Higher Education: A Policy Statement, AGPS, Canberra; Smart, D., & Dudley, J., 
1990, Education policy, Ch. 10, in Jennett, C., & Stewart, R.G., (eds.), 1990, Hawke and Australian public 
policy: Consensus and restructuring, Macmillan, Melbourne 
12 Beasley, K.C., 1992, International education in Australia through the 1990s, Ministerial Statement, 
September, AGPS, Canberra 
13 Marginson, S., 1993, From cloister to market: the new era in higher education, Journal of Tertiary 
Education Administration, May, Vol. 15, No. 1 
14 Smart, D. & Ang, G., Exporting education: from aid to trade to internationalisation? op.cit. p. 1 
15 Marginson, S., From cloister to market: the new era in higher education, op.cit. 
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sector and the fourth largest export sector.16 The contribution of education services 
exports to Australia’s export growth has risen markedly over recent decades. According 
to the Reserve Bank of Australia, since 1982, education services exports have grown at 
an average annual rate of 14 percent per annum in volume terms, compared with growth 
of around 6 percent both in total services and in total exports over this period. (See 
Figure 1.1)17 
 
Figure 1.1 
 
 
Over this period, education exports have increased markedly as a share of Australia’s 
total services exports, rising from less than 4 percent in 1982 to 25 percent in 2007, 
when education services displaced ‘other personal travel’ – a subcategory that captures 
                                                
16 Austrade, 2007, Education overview, Market Information - 
http://www.austrade.gov.au/Education/default.aspx and Dr Brendan Nelson, $113 million to strengthen 
international education, Media Release, 13 May 2003 - 
http://www.dest.gov.au/ministers/nelson/budget03/bud24_130503.htm 
17 2008, Australia’s export education services, Reserve Bank Bulletin, June - 
http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Bulletin/bu_jun08/aus_exports_education_services.html 
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travel services provided to leisure tourists – to become Australia’s largest service 
export. Education services exports now rank as one of Australia’s major exports behind 
coal and iron ore (Table 1.2).18 Moreover, within Australia’s education exports, higher 
education has grown most and makes the largest contribution to exports of education 
services. It represented around 60 percent of the value of education services exports in 
2007 (Figure 1.2).19 In Victoria, export education services is the state’s largest export. 
In New South Wales, education was second to coal. The reform of education aid was an 
important catalyst in the development and successful expansion of an education services 
export sector. In 2009, with the collapse of the global financial markets and depressed 
resource prices, the relative importance of export education services is expected to 
grow. 
Table 1.2: Australia’s Major Exports as a percentage share of total exports, 
2007(a) 
 
Coal 9.5 
Iron ore 7.5 
Education exports(b) 5.6 
Other personal travel   5.4 
Gold, non-monetary 5.2 
a) Current prices 
(b) Education-related travel services exports 
Source: ABS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid. 
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Figure 1.2 
 
 
OVERSEAS STUDENTS AND REFORM OF EDUCATION AID 
One little known and less understood consequence of the Hawke Government’s 
education aid reform is that it galvanised strong public expression of opposition and 
mobilisation of overseas students vigorously opposed to its reform. Primarily from 
developing countries in the Asia Pacific region and principal beneficiaries of Australia’s 
most successful component of its international development assistance, the Overseas 
Students Program, these students managed to independently organise protest against 
what they viewed as the commercialisation and increasing exploitation of higher 
education as an export commodity. They subsequently employed conventional 
repertoires of contention, for example, establishing formal organisational structures, 
using public action campaign tools and finding ways to gain local and international 
support, they sought to represent their claims at multi-government levels, build local 
community alliances and frame their arguments in an attempt to access prevailing 
avenues for influencing developments in government policy. As a group located outside 
the boundaries of domestic national political system, they sought to participate in public 
policy-making from a position of little political, social and legal rights. 
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In this thesis I ask the question: How did overseas students, located outside the 
boundaries of domestic politics and framework of citizenship and in a position of 
relatively limited, and in some instances absence of, political, social and legal rights, 
seek to influence the development of Australia’s export of education services policy that 
directly impacted on them? In answering this question, I will focus on the motivations 
behind, the methods used in, and the results of the overseas students collective action 
and their influence on Australia’s export of education services. In examining protest 
mobilisation, organisational formation and policy outcomes, I will consider four main 
questions: Why did overseas student collective action form? How did they respond to 
government policy and the development of Australia’s export education services sector? 
What strategies did they employ to address issues and grievances that directly affected 
them? How effective were they in extracting, agitating or procuring noticeable policy 
change? 
Identifying and tracing the processes that link overseas students’ activism with 
developments in Australia’s export of education services policy is the major 
methodological strategy of this thesis. Placing this process in a more general framework 
of contentious collective action and social movement process is my ultimate goal. The 
major question raised is whether temporary residents can indeed mobilise to influence 
domestic policy changes from a position of political dislocation. 
Here I lay out the thesis premises: 
First, as a group of temporary residents located outside the boundaries of domestic 
political system, overseas students mobilised in an attempt to influence Australian 
Government policy on education from a position of limited political, social and legal 
rights. Some observations can be made about the formation of overseas students 
collective protest: 
i) The mobilisation of overseas students in response to the Jackson Committee Report 
was ‘bottom-up’ driven. The existence of a loose network of overseas student 
organisations, formed under the Colombo Plan to create an informal protective support 
network, was an essential element in underpinning the formation of students’ 
mobilisation against education aid reforms in the eighties.  
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ii) The formation of overseas students collective action against fees in Australia was 
distinct compared to overseas students grouping in the United States of America (US), 
United Kingdom (UK) and New Zealand. When full fees were introduced in the US, 
UK and New Zealand, overseas students did mobilise against government policy 
change, but none went to the extent of forming a national body to represent their 
concerns. In the US, for example, overseas students submerged themselves within 
campus student clubs and societies, organising social events and promoting cultural 
understanding. In New Zealand and the UK, the existence of a strong national student 
representation and their strong advocacy on behalf of overseas students made it 
unnecessary for overseas students to form their own independent national structure. 
Overseas student representation in both these countries is advocated through respective 
overseas students’ departments within the national student unions. Unlike Australia, 
where the decline of National Overseas Students Services and the subsequent implosion 
of the Australian Union of Students in the early 1980s left a vacuum in student 
representation in general and overseas students in particular. 
Second, overseas students employed conventional repertoires of contention used by 
social movements – they established formal structures, adopted action tools, framed 
their claims, internationalised their protest, formed alliances – in an attempt to mobilise 
resources and access existing avenues to influence government’s export of education 
services policy. 
Third, their mobilisation response and campaign strategy achieved modest success in 
securing some policy concessions, particularly during the early stages of education aid 
reform. Their strategy, however, had to evolve as the fledgling export of education 
services sector expanded, and eventually they shifted their position to fully embrace and 
reinterpret the government’s own ‘language of liberalisation’, which they used to 
greater effectiveness in making subsequent claims. 
Fourth, overseas students’ subsequent ability to procure concessions is derived not from 
their political or universal rights to education services, but from their ability to influence 
policy changes based on their importance and strategic location in the Australian 
economy. In other words, government, universities and industry stakeholders have 
grown increasingly dependent on substantial revenue earnings derived from overseas 
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students and have become susceptible to potential chaos that may be precipitated if 
current students withdrew from the economy, or potential students chose alternative 
education service destinations such as the US, UK, Canada or New Zealand. However, 
the likelihood of current overseas students withdrawing from further participation in 
Australia’s education services is arguable due to considerable costs and resources 
required to participate in Australian higher education in the first place. But the capacity 
for overseas student leadership to potentially exercise influence on future students’ 
choice of study destination by generating bad publicity, for example, by questioning the 
inadequacies of quality education and support services offered by Australian 
institutions, or raising issues such as prevalent racism, cannot be underestimated. These 
substantive issues have broader implications on the role and relations between state, 
public policy and non-citizenship.  
This study will focus on the formal sector, the higher education sector. It will examine 
specifically the peak body representing the grievances of overseas students, the 
National Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in Australia (NLC). As this thesis 
will argue, the NLC characterises and symbolises the formation and mobilisation of this 
‘concern-specific’ voluntary group as it seeks to pressure and influence government 
policy on education services. This thesis will cover the period from 1985, when the 
government first introduced a range of policies and regulations to allow institutions to 
market their full fee programs overseas, to the early 1990s, when the export education 
services sector began to take a firmer root and underwent phenomenal rates of 
expansion. 
 
DEFINITIONS AND TERMS USED 
In developing a background understanding of this area of study it is important to define 
a number of key terms that will be used throughout the thesis and outline the scope and 
parameters of the study.  
Firstly, overseas students, foreign students and international students will be used 
interchangeably in this thesis. 
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Secondly, export of education services is most commonly associated with students 
coming to Australia to study but they can also include correspondence courses for 
overseas students, the electronic transmission of lectures and courses overseas, and 
Australians travelling overseas personally to provide various forms of education.20 
Thirdly, Australia’s export of education services sector is subdivided into two sectors: 
formal sector and non-formal sector. The formal sector comprises public and private 
secondary schools and universities and Colleges of Technical and Further Education 
(TAFE). The non-formal sector is made up of private colleges and institutes, which in 
the main, provide courses in commerce and related subjects and English language but 
also offer a wide range of other subjects from tourism management to legal studies. 
Fourthly, the OSP covers three categories of students: 
• Sponsored students 
• Subsidised students 
• Students paying the full cost of education or training 
The first two categories fall within Australia’s aid policy. Sponsored students receive 
scholarship assistance to assist them to live in Australia, and the Government pays the 
associated overseas student visa charges. They are selected under the bilateral aid 
programs negotiated between the Australian Government and the governments of other 
countries. The whole cost of the sponsored student program is part of Australia’s aid 
expenditure.21 
Subsidised students are selected by institutions on the basis of their academic 
qualifications, with quotas governing the number from any particular country and the 
number to be admitted to any specific institution or course. Such students receive no 
scholarship assistance from the Australian Government, and must pay the overseas 
student charges, between 32 to 45 percent of the average full cost of a place. TAFE and 
secondary students also pay fee charges. The balance is met by the Australian 
                                                
20 Industry Commission, 1991, Export of Education Services, Canberra, p.13 
21 Goldring, J., 1987, The Overseas Student program in perspective, National Liaison Committee for 
Overseas Students in Australia (NLC) Seminar, Melbourne, 22 May, p.2 
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Government, and is regarded as part of the cost of Australia’s aid program. This is 
justified because of the overwhelming proportion of subsidised students who come from 
developing countries.22 
Overseas students who pay the full cost of their education or training in Australia have 
no relation to the aid program. Such students have been coming to Australia for many 
years. Until the abolition of tertiary fees in 1974, most overseas students fell into this 
category, and since then many students from overseas have studied in Australia at full 
cost, but in specialist training programs outside Universities and Colleges of Advanced 
Education, including trade and technical training courses and English Language 
courses.23 
 
METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis was originally conceived in 1995, after my four and a half years (1991-95) 
of involvement as an overseas students representative at campus, state and national 
levels. Participation can affect historical accuracy and integrity of an area of research; 
however, it can also give insights and an advantage in discerning the topography of the 
areas of research focus. In 1991, I began my involvement as president of a campus 
overseas students association. For the next three years, my involvement expanded to 
include national office bearer positions (National General Secretary and National 
Education Officer) in the national overseas students body, the National Liaison 
Committee for Overseas Students in Australia (NLC), and national executive and 
national office bearer positions in the national tertiary student body, the National Union 
of Students (NUS). In my representative capacity in the NLC and NUS, I met hundreds 
of participants, read numerous publications on Australia’s international education, and 
directed activities of my own. My personal experience within the overseas students 
collective action in particular, and active involvement in larger student movements has 
given me the research and ‘insider’ advantages of accessing participants and documents 
which tend to be noticeably missing or ignored within the context of international 
education. 
                                                
22 Ibid. p.2 
23 Ibid, p.2 
 23 
In this thesis I adopt a case study method used extensively in examining social 
movements and movement-related processes. Case study is generally defined as a study 
that focuses empirically and analytically on a case of ‘something’, that is, on a single 
instance or variant of some empirical phenomenon rather than on multiple instances of 
that phenomenon.24 David A. Snow and Danny Trom argue, however, that this 
conceptualisation is narrow, simplistic and textbook fashion. They proffer instead a 
more meaningful and holistic definition by expanding and specifying its defining 
characteristics to include three components: (a) investigation and analysis of an instance 
or variant of some bounded social phenomenon that (b) seeks to generate richly detailed 
and “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon studied through (c) the use and triangulation 
of multiple methods or procedures that include, but are not limited to, qualitative 
techniques.25  
These points are expanded below:  
a) Investigation and analysis of an instance or variant of some bounded social 
phenomenon – seeks to answer the question of when is a case study a case study. A case 
study in the broad sense is defined by one or more of at least four considerations: (1) it 
is bounded in time and place, thus making the results of any study temporally and 
spatially contingent; (2) the primary phenomenon investigated in most studies can be 
classified as ‘a member of a larger set of broadly defined objects’; (3) the object of the 
study is ‘an instance of an important theoretical concept or process’; and (4) sometimes 
the focus of inquiry is ‘an intrinsically interesting historical or cultural entity in its own 
right’.26  
b) Richly detailed and “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon studied – in addition to 
the first defining characteristic, the second defining feature is the generation of a richly 
detailed, “thick” elaboration of the phenomenon under study and the context in which it 
is embedded.27 This involves highly focused and ‘microscopic’ analysis at a ‘meso’ or 
                                                
24 Snow, D.A. & Trom, D., 2002, The case study and the study of social movements, pp.146-172, in Bert 
Klandermans., & Suzanne Staggenborg, (eds.), Methods of social movement research: Social 
movements, protest and contention, volume 16, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 
25 Ibid, p.147 
26 Ragin, C. C., 1992, “Introduction: Cases of ‘what is a case?’” in What is a case: exploring the 
foundations of social inquiry, edited by Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, Cambridge University 
Press, New York 
27 Snow, D.A. & Trom, D., 2002, The case study and the study of social movements, op.cit., p.148 
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organisation level; for example, examining at a ‘microscopic’ level, the recruitment 
activities and processes of a movement, and its interactions with networks of actors, or 
at a broader and ‘macroscopic’ level the protest cycle or the nature of movement 
activity within a city or society over a period of time.28 The objective of this 
characteristic feature is to produce a thick, detailed, holistic understanding, or in Snow 
and Anderson’s perspective, to ‘understand and illuminate how the focal actions, 
events, and/or processes are produced and reproduced or changed by examining their 
ongoing interaction with other elements within the particular context.’29 
c) Use and triangulation of multiple models – the third characteristic featured in case 
study method suggests developing a ‘multilayered and nuanced’ understanding of the 
case study through the triangulation of multiple methods or procedures that include, but 
are not limited to, qualitative techniques.30 The mix of methods of qualitative 
procedures, according to Snow and Trom, may include ethnography and participant 
observation, varying forms of qualitative interviewing and the use of various documents 
and archives, particularly those that are indigenously generated, such as social 
movement fliers, pamphlets and newspapers. Snow and Trom argue that the relevance 
of such qualitative procedures to the case study is they are grounded in real-life 
situations and settings, and are therefore more likely to generate the kinds of data that 
allow for the development of richly detailed and holistic understanding of the 
phenomenon of interest.31  
What do these three elements together offer in analysing overseas students collective 
action? First, they capture a descriptive story of the formation, development and 
mobilisation of a group of disenfranchised individuals affected by changes in 
government policy, bounded in a particular period in time and place in history. Second, 
they present a particular ‘analytic type or representative of a genre movement’; in the 
case of this thesis, they focuses on a case study of a collective action by overseas 
students represented in a single national-level group and as a subset of a larger student 
                                                
28 Ibid p.149 
29 Snow, D.A., & Anderson, L., 1991, “Researching the homeless: The characteristics and virtues of the 
case study.” In a Case for the case study, edited by Joe R. Feagin, Anthony M. Orum and Gideon Sjoberg, 
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movement. Third, in focusing on the meso level analysis, they seeks to understand 
organisational fields and dynamics such as acquiring resources, establishing structures 
and processes, deploying tactical actions, and framing issues through regular 
interactions with government and industry stakeholders. Finally, they distinguishes this 
case study from other case studies in the area of international education, mobilisation of 
temporary residents or social movements. And through their descriptive rather than 
analytic approach, they seek to refine or extend movement-related theoretical arguments 
or conceptualisations.32  
The thesis draws from several sources. It uses existing research that highlights 
developments in Australia’s OSP, from aid since the early fifties to trade from mid 
eighties onwards. Understanding the historical development and evolution of the 
program places the formation of an overseas students coalition in perspective. Data and 
references on the micro and macro political economic environment are also used and 
examined. Materials such as Parliamentary Hansard, policy statements, Senate 
Committee reviews and communications between Government departments and the 
NLC are used to focus specifically on policy at three levels: (1) factors influencing 
policy implementation and change; (2) the policy process and shift; (3) the policy’s 
impact on overseas student numbers.  
I also draw from primary source documents available from overseas students 
organisations at campus, state and national levels. With the influx of overseas students 
into Australia under the Colombo Plan and opening up of the education services sector, 
leading to a proliferation of overseas student organisations. Materials from these student 
bodies, such as executive minutes, policy and conference documents, campaign 
materials and media releases are used to provide the foundation and insight into the 
mobilisation of the national organisation. The main sources of primary data are archives 
and documents from the NLC and NUS offices located in Melbourne and NLC state 
offices and campus overseas student organisations. Organisations, according to 
Clemens and Hughes, provide a useful starting point because they tend to produce 
documents.33 However organisational documents may omit or distort crucial 
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33 Clemens, E.S., & Hughes, M.D., 2002, Recovering past protest: Historical research on social 
movements, p.203, in Bert Klandermans., & Suzanne Staggenborg, (eds.), Methods of social movement 
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information in order to present the organisation more favourably, for the sake of present 
legitimacy or future legacy.34 To balance the use of organisational documents, I also 
drew on sources of information from newspapers and government documents. 
Newspapers, ‘whether a local sheet or a newspaper of record, are a staple for research 
on past protest.’35 
 
OUTLINE  
To situate the inquiry intellectually, Chapter two presents a conceptual framework 
drawn selectively from fields of social movements, protest and collective action. In this 
chapter, I base the context of overseas students collective action on three broad sets of 
factors used in analysing the prevailing explanation of contentious politics processes: 
political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes. I will use the three 
factors to analyse the timing and form of the overseas students collective action against 
reforms in education aid and its transition to education trade. By applying these three 
factors, I seek to explain the dynamics of collective action development, but specifically 
reflect them against how politically disenfranchised groups located outside the 
boundaries of citizenship seek to influence policies that directly affect them. 
Chapter three will provide a historical backdrop against which Australia’s Overseas 
Students Program (OSP) evolved. I will explore the evolution of the program from its 
inception in 1950 with the creation of the Colombo Plan, until 1985 when sweeping 
reforms were introduced to radically transform the program into a lucrative export 
education services sector. The program’s development will be examined in four 
distinctive parts: education aid, education expansion, education subsidy and education 
trade. 
Chapter four examines the formation of overseas student groups across Australia in 
response to developments in the education aid program. Evolution in education aid can 
be viewed in two sections: (i) the initial growth in overseas students’ social clubs during 
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 27 
the Colombo Plan, primarily prompted by community perceptions and curiosity on the 
one hand, and considerable demands on universities’ welfare support capacity to 
accommodate increasing numbers on the other; (ii) the second part involves overseas 
students’ response to government reforms of education aid, which subsequently sparked 
the mobilisation of overseas students strongly opposed to its policy recommendations. 
In this part, I explore in particular, government policy changes introduced in 1985 and 
its implications on overseas students’ mobilisation. 
In Chapter five, I delve deeper into the development of a national coordinating body, 
the National Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in Australia (NLC). The first 
attempt at national mobilisation failed. As the months went on, overseas student leaders 
recognised that their disparate campaigns against government policy were having little 
impact. The need to coordinate a national response, share limited resources and 
establish an information dissemination network eventually led to the establishment of 
the NLC. Different views amongst overseas student leaders on how to respond to 
government policy changes however remained, and continued to be an impediment 
towards forming a coherent national policy response. Such diverging views would, 
however, fracture the unity of the fledgling group and even threaten to prematurely end 
an attempt at establishing a national body. In this chapter I will describe the students’ 
second attempt at forming a national body; discuss the emergence of a three-tiered 
structure of campus, state and national representation; and examine its transformation in 
response to macro changes taking place in the export of education services sector. 
In Chapter six, I explore the NLC’s push to embed its legitimacy as the sole national 
overseas students representative and acquire resources to sustain its long-term viability. 
In this chapter, I focus on the NLC’s negotiations with the peak tertiary student body, 
the National Union of Students (NUS), to administer the new overseas students 
department within the Union. As a department of the NUS, it not only gave the NLC the 
added credibility of being part of a larger student movement, it also gave them direct 
access to funding and resources critical in ensuring its survival. Its involvement in the 
Union however gradually forced the NLC student leadership to participate actively in 
NUS politics in order to maintain access to financial resources and avoid political 
marginalisation. Though the NLC’s participation in the Union structure may have 
provided much needed access to resources, it did not necessarily resolve its financial 
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difficulties in the longer term. The ongoing political contestation for limited resources 
led to increasing strain in the NUS-NLC relationship, which ultimately led to a near-
breakdown in relations. 
In Chapters seven and eight, I shift my focus away from ‘meso’ organisational level to 
concentrate on the NLC’s response to government policy. The important question I 
address in both chapters is how did the NLC frame their claims on issues affecting 
them? I seek to demonstrate a contrasting approach to the NLC’s claims making, largely 
influenced by a shifting international education landscape and changes in overseas 
students’ demographic profile.  
In Chapter seven, I reflect specifically on the first segment, the NLC’s response to 
policy changes from early 1985 until 1991. This period considers the government’s 
gradual phasing-out of the subsidised fee program to complete implementation of full 
fees by 1991. Despite previous attempts at lobbying the government for a freeze in fees, 
the NLC realised that they had to rethink their campaign approach in light of changing 
economic and policy circumstances. The rethink would involve reframing and shifting 
the debate about education aid away from economic ‘cause’ to social impact arguments. 
In Chapter eight, I explore the evolution in the NLC’s campaign rhetoric. I will examine 
three campaigns that capture the development and transformation of the NLC’s claims 
making in response to changes in the export of education services sector. The first 
campaign sought to raise the public profile of government policy changes and its 
implications on overseas students. The second focused on efforts to stop the 
government extending its full fee program to include dependants of overseas students 
studying in elementary and primary schools. The third examines the way the NLC fully 
embraced and used the government’s ‘language of liberalisation’ towards reframing 
overseas students’ relationships with universities based on ‘consumer rights’ and ‘value 
for money’ rhetoric.  
Chapter nine is my concluding chapter. In this chapter I review key findings from my 
case study in light of the conceptual framework, and discuss potential future research 
agendas of relevance to the overseas students program in particular, and collective 
action of temporary residents broadly. 
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Two 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR OVERSEAS STUDENTS COLLECTIVE 
ACTION 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Can temporary residents located outside the boundaries of domestic politics and 
framework of citizenship, and in a position of relatively limited, and in some instances 
absence of, political, social and legal rights, influence public policy decisions that 
directly impact on them? My purpose in this chapter is to review theoretical approaches 
that shed light on this central research question. I draw selectively and critically from 
fields of social movements, protest and collective action to examine the emergence and 
development of collective action of temporary residents. I argue that disempowered and 
politically dislocated temporary residents can, under certain and specific conditions, 
attempt to influence public policy that directly affects them. 
The foundation of active citizenship is participation, and within the framework of 
citizenship individuals have the right to participate in regular voting rituals or form 
collective action groups to intervene in the political process in pursuit of their particular 
interest. Within this context, contemporary contentious politics theorists36 posit that 
when actions are based on dense social networks and connective structures and draw on 
consensual and action-oriented cultural frames, organised citizen groups can sustain 
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their actions in conflict with powerful opponents.37 My argument is that even without 
the presence of these instrumentalities to sustain collective action, those outside the 
framework of citizenship, non-citizens broadly and temporary residents specifically, can 
deploy similar action repertoires and depend on limited resources to take action like 
citizens. However, in absence of these instrumentalities, their actions tend to be 
sporadic and temporary due to: lack of economic and social security38; the language, 
ethnic and nationality divide among non-citizens; and the transitory nature of their legal 
status. 
My case study will focus on the development and mobilisation of overseas students’ 
collective action. I examine the context in which an overseas students’ collective action 
emerged; their attempts at mobilising limited resources and funding to support their 
claims-making; and the method and success in the way they framed their claims. In this 
chapter, I argue the formation and sustainability of disempowered groups’ actions are 
based on three broad sets of factors used in analysing the prevailing explanation of 
contentious politics processes. The three factors are: (1) the structure of political 
opportunities and constraints confronting the movement; (2) the forms of organisation 
(informal as well as formal) available to insurgents; and (3) the collective processes of 
interpretation, attribution, and social construction that mediate between opportunity and 
action.39 In this chapter these three factors will be referred to as: political opportunities, 
mobilising structures and framing processes. These will be used to analyse the timing 
and form of the overseas students’ collective action against the reform of education aid 
and the sector’s transition to education trade. By applying these three elements, I seek to 
explain broadly the dynamics of collective action development, but particularly reflect 
them against how politically disenfranchised groups located outside the boundaries of 
citizenship respond and attempt to alter policy norms that directly affect them. 
Before proceeding to describe and apply these concepts, it is important however to first 
locate overseas students within the context of citizenry and non-citizenry. I will then 
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briefly review current research that examines the political participation of temporary 
residents. Following the review of temporary residents’ participation, I will consider, 
broadly, temporary residents’ action within the context of social movements and 
collective action. I will consider in particular on foreign guestworkers, which has been a 
focus of previous theorising on political participation and status of non-citizens. 
Overseas students, as another group of temporary residents share several similarities 
with guestworkers, for example, overseas students’ entry into a country is fully 
regulated; their presence in a country is also determined for short periods and may be 
prolonged; and their mobility is largely driven by their economic aspirations. Moreover, 
since the expansion of the export of education services sector, overseas students have 
been allowed to be employed for twenty hours per week during semester and an 
unlimited number of hours at other times, making them a new and rapidly growing 
vulnerable sector of the workforce in Australia.40 
In this chapter I do not attempt a history of social movements or collective action. Nor 
do I present a particular theoretical perspective. Instead, my goal is to specify a 
framework that can be used to address actions of temporary residents as well as the 
main research agenda. By ‘framework’ I mean a coherent presentation of key 
intellectual concepts along with an argument as to how such concepts relate to one 
another.41 I offer a broad conceptual framework based on contentious politics and 
policy-making processes for understanding and analysing how a particular cohort of 
temporary residents independently organised to mount a contentious form of collective 
action against state policies that directly affected them. As Tarrow reminds us, 
collective action can take many forms—brief or sustained, institutionalised or 
disruptive, humdrum or dramatic. ‘Collective action becomes contentious when it is 
used by people who lack regular access to institutions, who act in the name of new or 
unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or 
authorities.’42 Overseas students, I argue in this thesis, formed a collective action in 
reaction to the government’s education aid reform. They subsequently institutionalised 
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their claims, sought to mobilise financial resources, and attempted to establish domestic 
and international networks to help sustain their opposition towards government policy. 
Their limited success in forcing significant policy changes led them to seek instead 
avenues in which they could participate and contribute to the development of the export 
of education services sector.  
 
CITIZENRY AND NON-CITIZENRY 
Thomas Hammar, in his book Democracy and the Nation-State, studies the increasing 
movement of people across national boundaries and its political implications for nation-
states. Hammar describes three categories that distinguish citizenry from non-
citizenry—foreign citizens, denizens and citizens.43 Illustrated in three concentric 
circles (See Figure 2.1), Category 1, the outer circle, represents foreign citizens who are 
given short-term or temporary permits to visit, work or study in the country. These 
temporary residents are an intermediate category located somewhere along the line 
between illegal immigrants at one end and permanent residents at the other. Temporary 
residents’ entry into a country is fully regulated under prescribed immigration 
regulations with little social and legal, and no political rights. Temporary foreign 
workers, refugees, overseas students, foreign diplomats and tourists are examples of 
temporary residents.  
Figure 2.1: Hammar’s Three Categories 
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Temporary foreign workers, for example, are authorised to perform non-permanent, 
fixed term services of labour.44 One group of foreign workers comprises highly skilled, 
highly qualified, well-paid professionals: executives, teachers and civil servants sent 
overseas by multinational companies or organizations for reasons that may include 
capital investment flows, international trade, military intervention, diplomacy or 
cultural interaction. Skilled personnel may include temporary residents visiting over a 
fixed period (usually two years) with an option for extension, or short-term business 
visits. Another group is the large group of blue-collar, manual or service workers who 
may in fact be highly skilled and educated, but who take non-managerial jobs in 
industries like childcare and domestic service, labour-intensive agriculture, garments, 
mining, construction and manufacturing.45 Commonly referred to as guestworkers, they 
are constrained in their employment in the host country in two specific ways: duration 
of stay and restriction to a particular sector, industry or employer.46 Their presence is 
driven largely by the economic imperative. Their work and residency are regulated for 
short periods and may be prolonged, but if so this also brings a risk of deportation, for 
instance due to unemployment.47 Temporary foreign workers or transnational migrants 
                                                
44 Miller, M.J., 1986, Special Issue: Temporary worker programs: Mechanisms, conditions, consequences, 
International Migration Review, Vol. 20, No.4, p.740 
45 Castles, S., & Miller, M.J., 1998, Age of migration: International population movements in the modern 
world, Macmillan Palgrave, UK 
46 Daniel Attas, 2000, The case of guest workers: exploitation, citizenship and economic rights, Res 
Publica, No. 6; Miller, M.J., 1986, Special Issue: Temporary worker programs: Mechanisms, conditions, 
consequences, International Migration Review, vol.20, no.4, pp. 740-757 
47 Hammar, T., Democracy and the Nation State: Aliens, denizens and citizens in a world of international 
migration, op.cit. p.21; Hong, N.S and Rowley, C., 2000, Globalization and Hong Kong’s labour market: 
the deregulation paradox, Asia Pacific Business Review, vol.6, no.3, pp.174-192 
 34 
are not only important contributors to the economies of the countries that receive them, 
but their remittances home (estimated by the World Bank to be approximately US$73 
billion annually) represent the second largest international monetary trade flow 
(exceeded only by petroleum exports) in the global economy.48 
Another major form of temporary movement of people is student mobility, in which 
students move from one country to another seeking opportunities in education services. 
Student mobility is a worldwide phenomenon. In 1980 there were more than a million 
overseas students studying in foreign education institutions,49 compared to 250 000 
students twenty years before.50 In 2008 there were more than 2.5 million university 
students estimated to be studying outside their own countries.51 By 2025, global demand 
for international higher education is forecast to grow to over 7 million places.52 
The next group comprising Category 2—the middle circle—is denizens. Denizens, or 
permanent residents, are granted permanent work and residence permits without time 
limits or need for prolongation, and they are conferred full social and legal rights, but 
usually not full political rights.53 ‘Denizens’, as Hammar describes it, is an old English 
word that up to the 1840s was used for ‘an alien to whom the sovereign has by letters of 
patent under the prerogative granted the status of a British subject’ but who was not 
allowed to ‘hold public office or obtain a grant of land from the Crown.’ Before 1844, 
full naturalisation required a decision by Parliament, a private act. This old usage of the 
term denizen as privileged aliens, who were not full citizens, seems, according to 
Hammar, to parallel the term proposed in his thesis about denizens of today. Hammar 
acknowledges that the term is used less today and is free from misleading connotations 
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or political values. He is quite clear however that the term is not used in the historic 
sense but is applied in a strictly technical manner for his exploration of domiciled 
individuals with residential status.54  
At the core, Category 3 represents all the citizens residing at home that were either born 
or have been naturalised into full citizenship. Naturalisation means the granting of full 
citizenship. Within this category, citizens have full access to what Antoine Dumont 
refers to as the ‘citizenship regime’ (legal status, voting rights).55 
Some observations need to be made about the non-citizens grouping. First, denizens 
together with temporary residents make up the ‘non-citizen’ community, comprising 
approximately 175 million individuals worldwide – or three percent of the world’s 
population.56 Their significance has attracted the interest of researchers interested in the 
increasing transient movement of people and its implications on nation-states and 
transnational space.57 Joppke points out two very different and potentially polarised 
positions and their implications. One perspective emphasises the enduring power of the 
nation-state, manifest in its capacity for control over entry and rights and through the 
continuing symbolic and material significance of national citizenship.58 The other view 
sees migration, and more specifically migrant rights, as the manifestation of an 
emergent ‘post-national’ society in which migrants can increasingly draw on 
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transnational rights located outside of the nation-state, rendering national citizenship 
redundant.59  
Second, non-citizens (denizens and temporary residents) are not a homogeneous group. 
They may be subdivided in a variety of ways, such as between those passing through 
(visitors), living in (residents) or living outside (non-residents) a particular state.60 
Third, despite their status and location outside the boundaries of citizenship, under 
certain conditions or upon fulfilment of state legal requirements, denizens may have the 
option to naturalise. Temporary residents on the other hand may become denizens and 
even naturalise in some instances; the hallmark of temporary worker policy however is 
the expectation of repatriation or return, whether administratively or economically 
induced or due to the volition of the migrants themselves.61 
Finally, since the 1970s, immigrants have increasingly articulated political concerns, 
participated in politics and sought representation. Their political mobilisation and 
claims making, Koopmans and Statham argue, is strongly focused on, and shaped by, 
the context of the receiving nation-states and is not significantly oriented toward, and 
influenced by supranational institutions, or transnational discourses and identities.62 
Castles and Miller provide examples in which immigrant protest movements have 
attempted to affect policies through a range of actions, such as persistent hunger strikes 
by immigrants and their supporters that brought pressure to bear on French and Dutch 
authorities to liberalise rules regarding legalisation.63 
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF NON-CITIZENS 
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With an overview of the citizenry and non-citizenry framework in mind, the next 
section will explore the political participation of non-citizens. Literature on citizen 
social movements continues to expand, and deepen under the rubric of social movement 
and contentious collective action theories.64 A key criticism of current literature on 
power and participation is the lack of consideration on temporary residents and their 
contribution to political interaction between state and non-citizen communities.65 
Recent literature tends to concentrate largely on denizens and citizens, investigating 
how the ‘powerless’ or ‘oppressed’ citizens and denizens seek to participate in public 
debates and articulate their claims to either instigate or influence policy changes within 
their national political space.66 Indeed, since the 1970s, as a new phase of international 
migration to highly developed countries took shape, there has been a growing interest in 
the relationships between institutions of the nation-state and nationals who permanently 
reside outside the boundaries of the state.67 Hammar, for example, examines the 
political participation of denizens in a number of countries in Europe and how some 
states, driven by economic demand for labour, have developed institutional alternatives 
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to citizenship as a way to accommodate the large influx of migrants. Hammar calls 
these innovative institutions “denizen rights”.68 Since 1960, twenty-four democracies 
have enfranchised at least some denizens, while several others have considered but 
rejected such rights.69 The incorporation of denizens and expansion of their political 
rights have Soysal suggesting that the traditional distinctions between permanent 
residents and citizens have begun to blur, giving rise to new forms of ‘post-national’ 
membership in European societies.70 
In cases where immigrant groups may not be beneficiaries of Hammar’s denizen rights, 
they have had to organise both domestically and transnationally to articulate their 
claims for economic, social and political rights.71 In Japan for example, Korean 
denizens have formed into interest groups to contest and negotiate the terms of their 
political incorporation.72 Erin Chung observed that rather than naturalise and become a 
small section of the voting population, Korean activists have increasingly used their 
non-citizen status as their “voice” to express their opposition to state policies, 
challenging Japanese citizenship based on the discourse of cultural homogeneity.73 
Koreans in Japan have managed to transnationalise their claims by regularly drawing on 
‘moral leverage and scepticism’ that characterises the broader Korean—Japanese 
relations, underscored by Japanese colonial atrocities before the Second World War. On 
the other hand, notes Michael Strausz, Turkish activists in Germany have lacked the 
same success because Germany did not commit atrocities against the Turkish 
community during the war, and there were not large numbers of Turkish victims.74 
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Moreover, the ability of the Turkish state to influence German policy, he argues, is 
further limited by the desire of many Turkish policy-makers to join the European Union 
and to have a good relationship with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation members.75  
 
 
Mobilisation of foreign workers 
While there is a growing body of literature examining mobilisation and participation of 
citizen and denizen groupings, little is written about temporary residents and their 
political participation. Participation, according to some theorists, is assumed to occur 
within decision-making and voting arenas, which are in turn assumed open to virtually 
any organised groups.76 However, outside the political arena of citizenry there exist 
several groups of temporary and permanent residents, with each having a stake in the 
public policy process.77 Temporary residents form a key and growing component of this 
fragmented and heterogeneous category, and have an interest in how policy directly 
affecting them is developed and implemented. Having no political rights, limited voice 
and minimal access to social and legal support, they reside in a space that seems beyond 
the sphere of influence and outside national political membership, which ostensibly 
limits how they seek to advocate their views and represent concerns. 
In his study of temporary foreign workers, Miller argues that the temporary workers’ 
fate is to exist at the margins of societies. Because of constraints created by 
unemployment and low wages at home, temporary workers seek employment abroad 
and are willing to endure certain deprivations such as restrictions placed upon 
temporary residency and employment, which render their status precarious.78 Miller 
further suggests that temporary workers may be afforded the right to unionise, but 
organisation of short-term workers whose residency rights hinge upon employment is 
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particularly difficult. The extreme vulnerability of temporary workers and their limited 
ability to protect themselves make close governmental regulation of their employment 
necessary.79  
Robert Tierney’s study of foreign guestworkers’ experiences in Taiwan in the context of 
class interest and conflict, highlights in particular the economic exploitation by both 
capital and the state, and marginalisation within the labour unions of guestworkers.80 
Indeed, in most countries with significant presence of foreign temporary workers, 
governments continue to impose or attempt to impose exclusionary immigration 
policies designed to keep foreign migrant workers isolated, marginalised and 
disempowered.81  
In some circumstances however, the state plays an important role in protecting 
vulnerable temporary workers from abuses and discrimination.82 The Philippines 
Government for example, established the Overseas Worker Welfare Administration 
(OWWA), passed the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (RA8042) 
and reformed the Philippines Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) specifically to 
intensify the protection and promote the welfare of its overseas workers, who provide a 
significant boost to the Philippines economy through the regular flow of remittances 
home.83 Similarly, multilateral organisations have also recognised the necessity of 
international mechanisms and policies to protect migrant workers and guarantee their 
rights. In 1990, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the International 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
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their Families.84 Hosting countries, however, tend to impose restrictions on rights and 
little is done to ensure that the conditions of temporary workers’ labour rights are 
upheld and protected. Yeoh et al. give the example of Singapore, which is not a 
signatory to international agreements relating to migrant workers, and considers such 
workers no more than a transient labour supply, and regulates them through a battery of 
controls effected through labour and immigration laws.85 
Any propensity to address cases of discrimination or apply policies to protect rights of 
temporary residents, therefore, may not necessarily stem directly from intervention of 
benevolent nation-states or supranational institutions. Increasingly, foreign workers 
have greater opportunities to assert their rights in a concrete and meaningful manner.86 
In South Korea for example, over the past decade, the position of foreign migrant 
workers has improved significantly. While still undertaking the so-called ‘3-D jobs’ – 
difficult, dirty and dangerous – foreign migrant workers have achieved meaningful 
gains in terms of wages, benefits, coverage for industrial and job-related accidents, and 
protection from abusive and exploitative employers.87 Timothy Lim, in his study of 
foreign migrant workers in South Korea, argues that these workers are ‘on the path 
(albeit a rocky one) toward securing legal recognition from the South Korean 
Government, which would not only guarantee protection of their basic ‘human rights’, 
but would also provide them the same legal rights and legal protections as domestic 
workers.’88 Lim suggests that the greater opportunity for temporary workers to exercise 
power may be due, broadly, to ‘certain transnational processes – specifically, 
democratisation and globalisation of human and labour rights standards, which have 
helped to lay the basis for new patterns of social relations,’ which have until recently 
excluded subordinate social groups.89 Though comprising a small proportion of the total 
workforce, temporary foreign workers occupy a structurally important role in a host 
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country’s economy. However, Singapore’s strict regulation of labour and immigration 
laws and attitudes towards temporary workers, for example, proves the exception to 
‘certain transnational processes’. In this city-state’s case, Yeoh et al. point out that 
foreign workers are brought in on a “use and discard” contract basis, remaining almost 
entirely outside the project of constructing civil society in Singapore. As such, there is 
little concern about whether they are accorded the opportunity to enjoy the full slate of 
civil rights in Singapore.90 
In spite of the transnational processes, the capacity to ‘collectivise grievances’ in the 
form of organised groups, and the ability to mobilise the ‘voting masses’ in solidarity 
behind an issue and act on an issue can be a powerful tool for affecting political change. 
In the case of the non-citizen community however, mass mobilisations of temporary 
residents are unlikely to form and where they do, rarely do they translate into policy 
change or meaningful political effect. The weakness of collective action of temporary 
residents, at least in the South Korean context, is due to two important factors. First, 
foreign migrant workers are generally divided by language, ethnicity and nationality – 
historically, the ability to play one group of migrant workers off against another has 
been a tried-and-true method of disempowerment.91 Second, the capacity of foreign 
workers to exercise power is limited because migrant work, by its nature, is transitory, 
thereby making it difficult to sustain a coherent strategy over time.92  
There are some instances where actions and strategies undertaken by foreign migrant 
workers have in fact been successful. However, their successes were premised largely 
on the sustained participation of domestic support networks of religious and civil 
organisations.93 Tierney for example, suggests in some cases the foreign workers 
themselves may mobilise temporarily, supported by migrant groups and in particular the 
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working class and its unions, to vehemently protest to highlight the frustrations, stark 
exploitation or degradation they experience in the workplace.94 The involvement of 
religious and civil labour organisations represents what Statham and Mynott refer to as 
‘altruistic mobilisation’.95 Altruistic mobilisation occurs when beneficiaries are too 
weak to make autonomous demands on political institutions. Such mobilisation is a 
form of ‘collective action that is strongly based in discursive strategies and public 
constituency building.’96 Statham and Mynott argue that: 
Altruistic movements mobilise to introduce a definitional 
change within the political discourse so that the interests of the 
beneficiary are defined as part of the common public good, and 
are no longer seen as something that can be provided for by the 
pursuit of individual interests – a market logic, which leads to 
“free-riding”. Anti-racist mobilisation aims to push state 
institutions to define racism and discrimination as detrimental to 
the whole of society not just a problem for individuals of ethnic 
minority origin. Pro-migrant mobilisation aims to push state 
institutions to see immigration as beneficial to the whole of 
society, and not just as the self-interest of the asylum seeker or 
foreign migrant, or potential employer. 97 
Lim suggests that through linkages with domestic groups, migrant workers have been 
able to use certain aspects of globalisation to their advantage – such as globalisation of 
a common discourse on human rights and democracy – as a political resource and to use 
their marginalised states as a powerful ideological weapon.98 Similarly in Hong Kong, 
Lisa Law observed that the existence of migrant worker organisations and coalitions 
actively addresses the injustices of guestworkers and frequently engages in protest 
campaigns on their behalf.99 For example, Filipino domestic workers in coalescence 
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with politically active groups such as United Filipinos in Hong Kong (UNIFIL) or the 
Asian Domestic Workers Union (ADWU) rallied successfully in support of wage 
increases and in opposition to increases in administrative fees or taxes imposed by the 
Philippines Government.100 Temporary foreign workers developing linkages with 
domestic action groups would be a key element in sustaining any actions that go beyond 
temporary and sporadic. 
 
POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILISING STRUCTURES AND FRAMINGS 
PROCESSES 
In the previous section I discussed the political participation and mobilisation of foreign 
workers. In this section, I will shift my focus to explaining political opportunities, 
mobilising structures and framing processes; in particular, I will elaborate how the 
dynamics of collective action formation and mobilisation are understood. In the field of 
social movements, protest and collective action, there has been an emerging consensus 
and convergence between different theoretical traditions with the combining of political 
opportunities (contextual factors), mobilising structures (organisational resources), and 
framing processes (discursive resources).101 In their book on Comparative Perspectives 
on Social Movements, Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald sought to 
synthesise a ‘profusion of work’ in the field of social movements under three broad sets 
of factors in analysing the emergence and development of social 
movements/revolutions: political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing 
processes.102 These three factors are also applied generally to formation and 
mobilisation of collective action. Each will now be discussed in turn. 
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1. Political opportunities 
Political opportunities or political processes explain how institutionalised politics – 
within the national context in which they are embedded – shape or incentivise the 
formation of social movements.103 Proponents of the political opportunities model104 
saw the timing and fate of movements as largely dependent upon the opportunities 
given to insurgents by the ‘shifting institutional structure and ideological disposition of 
those in power’.105 However, this is only one perspective. Conceptualisations of the so-
called ‘expansion and contraction’ of political opportunities vary greatly. For example, 
Sidney Tarrow suggests that some researchers focused on large-scale structures, others 
on ones that are proximate to particular actors; some analyse cross-sectional variations 
in political opportunity, while others look at how changes in political conflict and 
alliances trigger, channel and demobilise social movements.106 What has emerged, 
nevertheless, is an implicit typology of approaches to political opportunity structure.107 
Despite various perspectives on political opportunity, the interaction between protest 
groups and ‘institutionalised politics’ helps explain the formation of collective action 
‘on the basis of change in the institutional structure or informal power relations of a 
given national political system’.108 
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Tarrow defines political opportunity structure as ‘consistent – but not necessarily 
formal, permanent or national – signals to social or political actors which either 
encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements’ 
or collective actions.109 In specifying the dimensions of political opportunity structure, 
Tarrow and McAdam focus narrowly on four salient kinds of ‘signals’: the opening up 
of access to power, shifting alignments, the availability of influential allies, and 
cleavages within and among elites.110  
In the context of non-citizen mobilisation, these ‘signals’ or vulnerabilities have limited 
relevance, because unlike collective actions of citizen groups, non-citizens’ interest in 
mobilising to intentionally access power structures or exploit institutional cleavages is 
generally reactionary and may only occur in cases when policy change impinges 
directly on them. Secondly, Tarrow’s political specifications do not clearly explain the 
role and relevance of public policy in precipitating collective action. Meyer and 
Minkoff111 on the other hand, demonstrate a wider latitude in interpreting these political 
factors. They extends their specifications to include public policy, in which its relevance 
for analysis presents many possibilities including policies that produces formal 
recognition or new advantages for a constituency;112 introduces and adopts discrete 
policy changes;113 levels of appropriations;114 policy implementation;115 or actual 
                                                
109 Tarrow, S., 1996, States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements, p.54, in Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and cultural framing, Cambridge University Press, UK 
110 McAdam, D., 1996, Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions, in Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, 
mobilising structures and cultural framing, Cambridge University Press, UK, p.26-27; and Tarrow, S., 
1996, States and opportunities: The political structuring of social movements, in Doug McAdam, John D. 
McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, 
mobilising structures and cultural framing, Cambridge University Press, UK 
111 Meyer, D.S., & Minkoff D.C., 2004, Conceptualising political opportunity, Social Forces, June, 82(4), pp. 
1457-1492 
112 Gamson, W. A., 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. Wadsworth. Santoro, Wayne A. 2002. “The Civil 
Rights Movement’s Struggle for Fair Employment: A ‘Dramatic Events — Conventional Politics’ Model.” 
Social Forces 81:177-206; Strong, D., Waters, P.B., Driscoll, B., and Rosenberg. S., 2000, Leveraging the 
State: Private Money and the Development of Public Education for Blacks, American Sociological Review 
Vol. 65, pp. 658-81 
113 Banaszak, L.A., 1996, Why Movements Succeed or Fail: Opportunity, Culture, and the Struggle for 
Woman Suffrage. Princeton University Press; Burstein, P., 1991, Legal Mobilization As a Social Movement 
Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, American Journal of Sociology, vol. 96 pp. 1201-
25; McCammon, H,, Campbell, K., Granberg, E. and Mowery, C., 2001, How  
Movements Win: Gendered Opportunity Structures and U.S. Women’s Suffrage Movements,  
1866 to 1919, American Sociological Review vol. 66, pp. 47-70; Soule, S. A., McAdam, D., McCarthy, J.D. 
 47 
practices.’116 The inclusion of public policy factors, whether in addition to the 
institutional structures, or implicit in its institutional ambit is an important element 
within a political system in structuring the opportunities for collective action. Public 
policy is a substantiation of shifting institutional structures and ideological disposition 
of those in power. While political conflict and alliances can trigger, channel and 
demobilise social movements, public policy used as a political mechanism, can equally 
influence the expansion or contraction of political opportunities for collective action 
and catalyse or limit the formation of new groupings. 
 
2. Mobilising structures 
If institutionalised political systems shape the prospects and form of collective actions, 
then the second conceptual factor, mobilising structures, influences the way in which 
groups seek to organise. McAdam et al. broadly define mobilising structures as 
‘collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, through which people mobilise and 
engage in collective action.’117 Mobilising structures essentially focus on ‘meso-level 
groups, organisations and informal networks that comprise the collective building 
blocks’ of protest. They are derived from two distinct theoretical perspectives: resource 
mobilisation theory118 and political process model.119 Resource mobilisation theorists 
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focused on mobilisation processes and the formal organisational manifestations of 
political processes.120 McCarthy and Zald in particular focused primarily on formal type 
organisations, Social Movement Organisations (SMO). SMO are manifestations of 
social movements, in which they become institutionalised and professionalised 
organisations operating like private companies.121 Political process model theorists on 
the other hand, approached organisational dynamics of collective action from an 
informal grassroots mobilisation such as work, churches, women’s networks, 
neighbourhoods.122 Despite their contrasting positions, both present a broader scope 
within an informal-formal spectrum to explain the structural forms of movements and 
their evolution.  
In any concrete social setting, activists have a choice of a range of mobilising structures 
as they attempt to create new movements or nurture and direct ongoing ones.123 The 
choice of establishing an informal or formal mobilising structure plays an important role 
in determining the success and sustainability of any collective action. McCarthy (See 
Table 2.1)  for instance, argues that the choices that activists make about how to more 
or less formally pursue change have consequences for their ability to raise material 
resources and mobilise dissident efforts, as well as for society-wide legitimacy – all of 
which can directly affect the chances that their common efforts will succeed.124  
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Table 2.1 Dimensions of Movement Mobilising Structures125 
 
 Non-movement Movement 
Informal Friendship networks 
Neighbours 
Work networks 
Activist networks 
Affinity groups 
 
Formal Churches 
Unions 
Professional associations 
SMOs 
Protest communities 
Movement schools 
 
McCarthy suggests at the informal end of the organisational spectrum – ‘the 
micromobilisation contexts’126 – are ‘families and networks of friends’. The kinship and 
friendship structures are the basic structures for mobilisation and recruitment of 
activists. In the less informal organisational structure are informal networks, for 
example, social movement communities.127 Prayer groups, caucuses, study groups and 
sports teams are some examples of community level and informal organising. Another 
common form is the freestanding protest campaign committee that links networks, 
organisations and caucuses together in order to coordinate events and efforts.128  
While Social Movement Communities (SMC) are ‘informal communities of politicised 
individuals with fluid boundaries, flexible leadership structures, and malleable divisions 
of labor’, at the formal organisational end of the spectrum are Social Movement 
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Organisations (SMO).129 In contrast to SMC, SMO are formal, complex organisational 
structures and can vary in their institutional form, from ‘independent local’ volunteer 
based groups, and national professional associations such as the Public Interest 
Research Group130 to international groups that cross national boundaries, such as 
Amnesty International and Greenpeace.131 With a range of options available within the 
informal-formal spectrum of mobilisation, collective action actors, McCarthy suggests, 
most often adopt forms that are known to them from direct experience.132 
For collective action actors that instead adopt formal organisational structures, 
Hanspeter Kriesi offers four broad factors for analysing organisational development: 
organisational growth, internal structuration, external structuration, and goal 
orientations and action repertoires. 
i) Organisational growth – in the early phases, collective action networks tend to be 
weak and informally structured. Resources from conscience constituents and supportive 
elites are not easily forthcoming. Collective action actors have to attract public attention 
to their cause, and they have to create their constituency and elite patronage on their 
own – either by explicit consensus mobilisation or as a by-product of their action 
mobilisation.133 
ii) Internal structuration – during their development phase, organisations undergo a 
process of formalisation, professionalisation, internal differentiation and integration. 
Formalisation, according to Kriesi, means the development of formal membership 
criteria, the introduction of formal statutes and established procedures, and the creation 
                                                
129 Buechler, S., 1990, Women’s movements in the U.S., Rutger University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 
p.42 
130 McCarthy, J.D. & Zald, M. N., 1973, The trend of social movements in America: Professionalization and 
resource mobilization, General Learning Press, Morristown, N.J. 
131 Smith, J., Pagnucco, R. & Romeril, W, 1994, ‘Transnational social movement organisations in the 
global political arena’, Voluntas, No.5, pp.121-154 cited by McCarthy, J.D., 1996, ‘Constraints and 
opportunities in adopting, adapting and inventing, p.144, in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy and Mayer 
N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political opportunities, mobilising structures and 
cultural framings, Cambridge University Press, USA 
132 McCarthy, J.D., 1996, Constraints and opportunities in adopting, adapting and inventing, in Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and cultural framing, Cambridge University Press, UK 
133 Kriesi, H., 1996, The organisational structure of new social movements in a political context, in Doug 
McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald, Comparative perspectives on social movements: Political 
opportunities, mobilising structures and cultural framing, Cambridge University Press, UK, p.149 
 51 
of a formal leadership and office structure. Professionalisation means management by 
paid staff members who make careers out of movement work. Internal differentiation 
concerns the functional division of labour (task-structure) and the territorial 
decentralisation (territorial subunits). The integration of the differentiated functional 
and territorial subunits is achieved by horizontal coordinating mechanisms, and by 
centralisation of decisions.  
The process of internal structuration, Kriesi argues, is virtually inevitable; if the 
organisation is to have success in the long run, it will need to undergo centralisation. 
Centralisation contributes to stability of an organisation.134 
iii) External structuration - Kriesi refers to external structuration as the integration of a 
formal organisation into its environment. There are at least three dimensions to this 
effect: the organisation’s relations with its constituency, its allies and the authorities. 
Organisations are highly dependent on their constituency, since its main activity 
consists in mobilising its constituency for collective action. Having support from strong 
allies is another dimension of an organisation’s development. Powerful allies may 
provide important resources but on the other hand reduce the organisation’s autonomy 
and threaten its stability in the long run. The third dimension involves establishing a 
working relationship with the authorities. The extent of the working relationship may 
have adverse effects. Public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and 
public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for an 
organisation; however the integration into established systems of interest intermediation 
may impose limits on the mobilisation capacity of the organisation and potentially 
alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the 
long run.135 
iv) Goal orientations and action repertoires – a fourth factor in analysing an 
organisation’s development. Kriesi argues that an organisation undergoes two 
significant changes as part of its development: its goal transforms, becoming 
increasingly conservative, and accommodating ‘dominant societal consensus’; and it 
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shifts towards ‘organisational maintenance’, in which the organisation’s primary 
activity becomes the maintenance of membership, funds and other requirements of 
organisational existence. In the process, the action repertoires of the organisation are 
also expected to be modified and tending to become more moderate, more conventional, 
more institutionalised.136 
 
3. Framing processes 
Framing processes are the third broad set of factors in combination with political 
opportunities and mobilising structures. Mediating between opportunity, organization 
and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people bring to their situation.137 
McAdam et al. note that political opportunities and mobilising structures alone are 
insufficient to account for collective action. Ideas, cultures and sentiments are the more 
‘cognitive or ideational dimensions’ of collective action.138 Drawing on David Snow’s 
original conception, McAdam et al. narrowly define framing as referring to the 
conscious strategic efforts by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the 
world and of themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action.139 The shared 
understanding also extends to the problematic condition or situation they define as in 
need of change, making attributions regarding who or what is to blame, articulating an 
alternative set of arrangements, and urging others to act in concert to affect change.140 
Snow and Benford refer to these core functions of a collective action frame, or ‘what 
frames must do,’ as diagnostic framing, prognostic framing and motivational 
framing.141  
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• Diagnostic framing presents to potential recruits a new interpretation of issues or 
events - what is wrong and why; 
• Prognostic framing presents a proposed solution to the problem suggested in the 
diagnosis or at least a plan of attack, and the strategies for carrying out the plan – 
what is to be done;142 
• Motivational framing attempts to give people a rationale for engaging in 
ameliorative collective action including the construction of appropriate vocabularies 
of motive.143 The problem defined in the diagnosis and the solution in the prognosis 
are usually sufficient to get people to act – the ‘call to arms’144 The call for 
collective action, Benford and Snow suggest, usually involves the construction and 
adoption of ‘socially constructed vocabularies’ used to provide ‘adherents with 
compelling accounts for engaging in collective action and for sustaining their 
participation.’145  
How are frames constructed? Frames can be ‘bottom-up’ or ‘top-down’. John Noakes 
and Hank Johnston, for example, observed protesters mobilising and interacting with 
each other or the community in the streets to construct alternative interpretations of 
events as an example of ‘bottom-up’ frames.146 Their meaning evolves over time as they 
confront alternative interpretations of events, sometime being co-opted and used for 
purposes unintended by their originators.147 Top-down driven frames stem mainly from 
the so-called ‘social movement entrepreneur’ – people who exhibit strategic initiative in 
promoting their message – or leaders and organisers, making practical decisions in 
response to the styles, forms and normative codes of the target audience.148 According 
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to Snow and Benford, the communication of an entrepreneur’s message to current and 
potential constituents is done through two processes: articulation and amplification. 
Social movement entrepreneurs articulate frames by connecting and aligning events ‘so 
they hang together in a relatively unified and compelling fashion’, thus offering a new 
perspective on events or situations.149 ‘Slices of observed, [sic] experiences and/or 
recorded reality’, Benford and Snow argue, ‘are assembled, collated and packaged.’150 
The articulation process involves drawing from the ‘cultural tool kit’ of mobilising 
symbols, which contains diverse and often contradictory symbols which a movement 
entrepreneur may use to emphasise or to repackage.151 As Benford and Snow note, it is 
this selective ‘punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
sequences of action’ that renders events meaningful to potential recruits.152 
Amplification of collective action frames involves highlighting or accenting of various 
issues, events or beliefs from the broader interpretive sweep of the movement.153 These 
punctuated or accented elements function as part of the discursive process when frames 
are articulated. Johnston and Noakes suggest that the development of a poignant set of 
symbols allows a movement’s frame to be carried out quickly and efficiently. An 
example of frame amplification is the bumper stickers or catchphrases such as ‘I’m pro-
choice and I vote’, ‘Abortion is murder’.154  
The condensing of broad issues distilled into sharp catchphrase messages attempts to 
cut an issue in a different way in which it captures attention and resonates effectively to 
mobilise people to take collective action. To this extent the content of frames, or the 
materials component of the interpretive schema, becomes an important element in frame 
making.  
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COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMEWORK AND OVERSEAS STUDENTS 
In this thesis, I seek to apply all three factors in the collective action framework to help 
understand the emergence and mobilisation of overseas students’ action against changes 
to the overseas students program. The framework maps, in general, concepts that 
explain how and why collective action forms, what mobilising structural shape they 
take, and how collective action actors attempt to frame their arguments in support of 
their claims. McAdam et al. argue that scholars have tended to study only one aspect of 
a movement, for example, the effect of expanding political opportunities or the 
organisational dynamics of collective action. In isolation, each element within the 
framework offers a one-dimensional perspective of collective action. When linked 
together however, their interactivity offers a broader and deeper understanding of the 
origins of collective action and the extent and form it takes over time. The challenge 
however, according to McAdam et al., is to ‘sketch the relationships’ between these 
factors to yield a fuller understanding of collective action dynamics.155 This thesis seeks 
to take up this challenge by applying the framework to give a fuller understanding of 
the factors and processes that shaped the collective action of overseas students, its 
emergence on the one hand, and its ongoing development on the other. 
To understand the factors that led to the emergence of overseas students’ collective 
action, we would need to consider the first element, political opportunities. The political 
opportunities structure helps explain the shift in public policy and its significance in 
catalysing the formation of overseas students’ collective action and their subsequent 
mobilisation. As McAdam et al. argue, political opportunities are necessary 
prerequisites to action.156 Developments and changes in aid policy, whether driven by 
political, economic or foreign policy considerations are arguably an influential factor in 
understanding not only the timing of emerging collective action, but also the form the 
action takes. During the early developments of the Colombo Plan, overseas students’ 
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political mobilisation was constrained due to: the aid emphasis of the Australian 
Government program, tightened scholar restrictions, new policies introduced to regulate 
satisfactory progress, and conservative community cultural attitudes. As policies 
governing the aid program were relaxed from the 1970s onwards, constraints on 
political mobilisation were eased, allowing the eventual formation of overseas students’ 
action against the government’s education aid reforms in the early 1980s. Though the 
policy environment may have played a significant role in catalysing the formation of 
overseas students’ mobilisation, its influence does not end at the emergent phase. The 
shaping and reshaping of the policy environment and the structure of political 
opportunities now becomes more a product of the interaction of the overseas students 
group with its environment than a simple reflection of changes occurring elsewhere.157 
The policy environment continues to play a significant role on the development of the 
overseas students group, as the group continues to play an important role in influencing 
the broader export of education services sector’s landscape. 
With the political opportunities structure in mind, we will need to consider the second 
element in the collective action framework, mobilising structures. McAdam et al. argue 
that at the emergent phase of a collective action, the availability of mobilising structures 
of sufficient strength – whether formal or informal – is important in getting a movement 
started.158 Without the existence of sufficient organisation, such opportunities for action 
are not likely to be seized. The existence of campus based overseas student 
organisations were an important factor in contributing to a loose network of connective 
structures crucial in underpinning the emergent phase of overseas student mobilisation. 
However, once a collective action is underway, a new set of challenges takes over. It is 
no longer the simple availability of mobilising structures or a loose network of 
connective structures, but developing an organisational profile of a particular group that 
claims to represent its larger constituent that becomes important.159 Overseas students 
formed a national body, the National Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in 
Australia (NLC) to organisationally represent their collective action. The students 
subsequently created a more enduring organisational structure to support their actions, 
formed larger community networks to widen avenues for opposition, employed 
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appropriate tactical actions to instigate policy change and attempted to acquire resources 
(funding and facilities) to help sustain their mobilisation. In developing a sustainable 
organisational structure, in response to rapid expansion of the export of education 
services sector, the NLC underwent periods of restructuring to strengthen their internal 
structures; professionalising their management practices and moving from a 
decentralised to a centralised decision-making structure to create a stable and 
professional representative body. As their organisation developed, the NLC gradually 
became more conservative, accommodating dominant government and industry 
consensus and becoming more moderate, more conventional and more 
institutionalised.160  
The third element mediating between structural requirements of political opportunity 
and organisation is the emergent meanings and definitions – or frames – shared by the 
supporters of collective actors.161 Framing is important not only in the early phase of 
shaping the emergence of collective action but also at the later stage of its development. 
Framing at the early stage is different from the later stage. During the emergent phase, 
framing is less consciously strategic. McAdam et al. argue, that ‘at the outset, 
participants may not even be fully aware that they are engaged in an interpretive process 
of any real significance. This is certainly not the case later on as various factions and 
figures within the movement struggle endlessly to determine the most compelling and 
effective way to bring the movement’s “message” to the “people”.’162 The framing 
processes shed some light on the way overseas student leaders sought to frame their 
message to mobilise their constituents and gain broader community support against 
changes to government policy. In the initial stage of education aid reforms, overseas 
students framed their arguments based on education aid as a ‘right’ for students from 
developing countries. Within the ‘education rights’ frame, they reinterpreted issues 
such as deportation and financial pressures to propose solutions such as a freeze in fees 
and instalment payment schemes as ways to alleviate pressures imposed on students due 
to policy changes. Their campaign achieved modest success in securing some policy 
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concessions, particularly at the early stages of education aid reform. However, their 
strategy evolved as the fledgling export education services sector developed; they 
subsequently embraced and reinterpreted the government’s own ‘language of 
liberalisation’, and repackaged their claims based on ‘consumer rights’. They than 
amplified their new claims by adopting catchphrases such as ‘your money, your rights’, 
‘value for money’ and ‘milking cows’. The condensing of these issues into sharp 
catchphrases was used with greater effectiveness in attracting the attention of domestic 
and international media and making consequent claims to government. 
 
OVERSEAS STUDENTS’ POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
I have so far considered how overseas students, as temporary residents, fit within the 
context of Hammar’s citizenry and non-citizenry construct; I then proceeded to 
introduce the collective action framework as a tool to consider the emergence and 
mobilisation of overseas students’ collective action. I will now consider how overseas 
students’ participation in the Australian export of education services sector is viewed in 
current literature. There is no research focusing on overseas students and their 
participation and representation in political life. Available research significantly focuses 
on the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ levels of overseas student contribution in general and the 
export of education services sector in particular. The current discourse about the 
overseas students program broadly tends to be pragmatic, implicitly positivistic and 
multi-disciplinary.163 
From a ‘macro’ perspective, the literature is confined predominantly to the economic 
and political benefits of the overseas students program. Since the mid-eighties, 
substantive literature concentrated on the economic dimensions, the demand and supply 
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for educational services.164 Harris and Hooke in particular, testify to the commercial and 
export benefits of the program to the national economy. Kemp explores the higher 
education export industry in Australia and assesses the growth and impact of overseas 
students in the country. Kemp also cites and analyses the flow of students from Asia 
and investigates factors affecting overseas students’ choice of educational 
destination.165 
From a political dimension, numerous research papers explore the motivation for the 
supply of and demand for educational services.166 Curt Anderssen, for example, probes 
the domestic politico-nationalist welfare policy of Malaysia’s New Economic Policy 
and its influence on non-Malay demand for Australian export education services.167 
Brown argues that the changing emphasis in Australia's international education policy 
from aid to trade manifests certain contradictions, contestations and complexities in the 
context of Asia-Australia relations, and that Australian policy continues to reflect 
attitudes variously identified as post-colonialism, neo-colonialism, orientalism, and the 
construction of the 'other'.168 From an immigration perspective, Nesdale, Simkin, Sang, 
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Burke and Fraser, in their study commissioned by the Bureau of Immigration, 
Multicultural and Population Research, reveal the results of a research project 
examining the causes, processes and consequences of overseas students studying in 
Australia and explore the relationship between an increase in overseas students in 
Australia and subsequent immigration of these students to this country. The project also 
considers economic, educational and foreign relations implications that the relationship 
between study and immigration might have for Australia.169 
At a ‘micro’ level, the research tends toward a socio-welfare view. Current literature 
covers nearly every facet of student experiences; practical challenges, including 
accommodation and visas170; emotional and affective issues – such as loneliness171, 
stress and homesickness172; cultural adaptation and integration173; English language 
acquisition and competence174; pedagogical difficulties175; curriculum and assessment176 
and performance and outcomes177. The contribution of Deumert, Marginson, Nyland, 
Ramia and Sawir has extended the socio-welfare perspective of overseas students to 
                                                
– Albinski, H., 1996, Australia's external policy/international education nexus. Journal of Institutional 
Research in Australasia, September v.5 n.2 p.1-13 
169 Nesdale, D., Simkin, K., Sang, D., Burke, B., & Fraser, S., 1995, International students and 
immigration, Aust Govt Pub Service, Canberra 
170 Nesdale, D., Simkin, K., Sang, D., Burke, B., & Fraser, S., ibid.; Radford, H.B.M, Ongkili, D.J., & 
Toyoizumi M., 1984, Overseas Students in South Australia, Flinders International Students Association, 
Flinders University of South Australia, Adelaide; 
171 Sawir, E., Marginson, S., Deumert, A., Nyland, C., Ramia, G., 2008, Loneliness and international 
students: An Australian study, Journal of Studies in International Education, Vol.12, No. 2., pp. 148-180 
172  Raman, L., 1983, Racism and overseas tertiary students, NSW Ethnic Affairs Commission, Sydney, 
NSW; and Browne, R.K. & Dale, E.C, (eds.), 1989, Overseas Students, Educational Opportunity and 
Challenge, Australian College of Education Curtin, A.C.T 
173 Lee. L, 1991, The cultural adaptation of Chinese tertiary students in South Australia: a humanistic 
sociological analysis of the cultural experiences of Chinese who were students in Australia. Adelaide: 
University of Adelaide. Med; Sanderson, G., 2000, Promoting a culture of support at Australian 
universities. ARIES v.1 n.2 p.91-101, Summer; Dunstan P., 2003, Cultural diversity for life: a case study 
from Australia. Journal of Studies in International Education v.7 n.1 p.64-76, Spring 
174  Paltridge, B., 1991, English as an international language: an overview. In 'Proceedings of the 4th 
Annual Education Conference [of the ELICOS Association], Monash University, Melbourne, 21-23 August; 
Coffey, M., 1997, Intercultural advising in English-language programs. Washington DC: NAFSA 
Association of International Educators; and Lewit, T., 2002, Overseas students: making the transition 
across intellectual traditions. In 'Mind the gap : transition from all perspectives : papers from a roundtable 
conference' pages 62-63. Parkville Victoria: Transition Program, University of Melbourne 
175 Allan, M., 1997, Assisting autonomous performance. Prospect v.12 n.3 p.4-14, Dec 
176 Nouwens, F. and Robinson, P., 1991, Evaluation and the development of quality learning materials. 
Australian Journal of Educational Technology v.7 n.2 p.93-116, Summer 
177 Murray, M.H, 1997, Students, learning, resources : an inseparable triad. Australasian Journal of 
Engineering Education v.7 n.2 p.129-134, 
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include gaps in ‘governance of overseas students’ rights’. In their work on overseas 
students and employment, they argue that existing social protection in Australia fails to 
recognise students’ rights.178 
Although there is some discussion of the overseas students’ educational benefits to 
institutions, it tends to be located within an audit culture concerned with performance 
indicators, market research and educational 'massification'. Little research at this stage 
however has examined another dimension of the export education sector, specifically 
the role of a national overseas student body established to directly lobby, challenge and 
influence change in government and industry policy in the delivery of education 
services. Within existing literature on overseas students, none have explored the 
development, role and contribution of this student body in improving overseas students' 
health and welfare support policies and advocating regulations and guidelines to 
safeguard their 'consumer' education rights. 
One explanation for the lack of examination and analysis is that most observers believe 
that the overseas student coalition in Australia had little if any impact on the 
government's export of education services agenda;179 any changes to industry policy 
were a result of government’s and industry's response to market forces, broader 
consumer trends and international competitiveness, rather than due to effectiveness of 
student representation.180 This thesis will test this assumption by exploring the role of 
overseas students in influencing Australia's export education policy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I have argued that the theoretical variables – political opportunities, 
mobilising structures and framing processes – within the social movement framework 
                                                
178 Deumert, A., Marginson, S., Nyland, C., Ramia, G., & Sawir, E., 2005, Global migration and social 
protection rights: The social and economic security of cross-border students in Australia, Global Social 
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180 Harold, R., 1990, Marketing the academy: Aspects of exporting higher education courses, A report 
prepared for the Industry Commission and Browne, R.K. & Dale, E.C, (eds.), 1989, Overseas Students, 
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have thus far focused broadly on the formation of collective action within the 
citizenship sphere, which is based on the assumption that in a democracy there is little 
impediment for citizen groups to mobilise in response to political opportunity, create 
dense networks and access available resources to make claims and take action. To date, 
this framework has not been extended to understand its application outside the regime 
of citizenship. This thesis attempts to apply the framework to analysing the collective 
action of overseas students and their mobilisation against education aid reforms. It aims 
to explain the development of overseas students’ action, how they largely mimicked 
and, arguably, adopted similar trajectories to social movement mobilisation. 
In this chapter, I have done three things. I firstly explored the location of overseas 
students, as a group of temporary residents, within Hammar’s framework of citizenry 
and non-citizenry. Secondly, I examined the mobilisation of temporary residents within 
the context of non-citizenry. Finally, I considered the three factors within the collective 
action framework – political opportunities, mobilising structures and framing processes 
– in explaining broadly, the dynamics of collective action development, but applying it 
to overseas students as an example to assist in understanding how a politically 
disenfranchised group located outside the boundaries of citizenship can respond and 
attempt to alter policy norms that directly affect them. In seeking to understand political 
participation of non-citizens, I focused my discussion on foreign guestworkers because 
they share similarities with overseas students and have been the focus of previous 
theorising on the political status and activities of non-citizens. In the next chapter I will 
consider the first factor within the framework, political opportunities, and its 
importance in catalysing the formation and development of overseas students’ 
representation since the beginning of the Colombo Plan. 
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Three 
 
OVERSEAS STUDENTS PROGRAM FROM 1950 TO 1985 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The beginning of Australia’s active interest in education aid began with the Colombo 
Plan in 1951. Over the next twenty years, the Plan would undergo major administrative, 
academic and welfare changes to emerge as an important part of Australia’s foreign 
policy agenda and the foundations of an Overseas Students Program (OSP). When the 
Labor party took government in 1972, the OSP underwent considerable expansion, 
continuing to play a significant role in foreign policy, while shifting more into core 
areas of higher education policy and planning. Australia continued to expand its 
engagement with the Asia Pacific region, increasing the volume of development 
assistance and university places for overseas students. By the mid-seventies however, 
Labor’s audacious education expansion would prematurely end with the sacking of 
Prime Minister Gough Whitlam and return of a conservative Liberal led coalition under 
Malcolm Fraser. Rapid deterioration of the global economic environment imposed 
further financial pressures on Fraser’s government, having considerable impact on the 
higher education sector and the OSP specifically. Protectionist policy tendencies began 
to take root in the program with new restrictive policy measures initiated, quota places 
imposed and partial fee charges introduced. Fraser’s reluctance to enforce bolder 
economic reforms led to the election of a Labor government, which subsequently 
resolved to introduce radical changes to the OSP and participate in the development of a 
new export services sector. 
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In this chapter I will examine the historical backdrop against which Australia’s OSP 
evolved. I will explore the evolution of the program from its inception in 1950 with the 
creation of the Colombo Plan until 1985, when sweeping reforms were introduced to 
radically transform the program into a lucrative export education services sector. The 
OSP’s development will be examined in four distinctive parts: education aid, education 
expansion, education subsidy and education trade. The purpose of this chapter is to 
introduce the shifting institutional policies governing the development of education aid 
and its transformation into education trade. The policy shift set the context for the 
formation of overseas students’ collective action. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION AID 
In 1937, Joseph Lyons’ United Australia Party government introduced a common entry 
policy for all Asian students wishing to study in Australia. To qualify for an Australian 
education, students had to pay full tuition fees, study full-time, demonstrate adequate 
financial support and make satisfactory progress towards completing their degree. 
Beyond the common entry requirement such policy held little official interest to the 
Australian Government. Students were seen merely as a means of facilitating cultural 
exchange or gaining access to regional trade opportunities.181 
By the end of the Second World War this circumscribed view changed. While American 
and European institutions were overcrowded with ‘reconstruction trainees’, the new 
Asian nations became increasingly aware of the geographical proximity of Australia 
and the quality of training offered by its education institutions.182 Equally capturing the 
attention of Australian policy-makers was the growing geo-political and strategic 
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importance of the emerging Asian nations to Australia’s foreign and defence policy 
thinking.183  
The beginning of Australia’s active interest in a regional educational aid policy can be 
located in the Commonwealth Declaration, a forum comprising former British colonies 
primarily aimed at encouraging consultation and cooperation between its member 
Commonwealth states. Out of this consultation and cooperation emerged the Colombo 
Plan and the Commonwealth Scholarship and Fellowship Plan aimed at facilitating 
education and training specifically for developing nations. The Colombo Plan, 
formulated in 1950 at a Foreign Ministers’ conference of Commonwealth nations in 
Colombo, Sri Lanka, involved developed nations such as Britain, Canada and Australia 
providing education aid to developing South and South East Asian countries.184 At the 
early stage of the Plan’s development, membership was voluntary and was limited to 
Commonwealth countries. However from 1 July 1951 until 1 July 1957, its membership 
extended to involve all countries in South and South East Asia, the United States and 
Japan.185 Although it was originally conceived to run for a period of six years, the 
Colombo Plan’s success continued until 1980, eventually losing its effectiveness by the 
mid-eighties. 
 
Colombo Plan and Education Aid 
Unlike the Marshall Plan186 that was developed and organisationally structured to assist 
Europe’s postwar rehabilitation, the Colombo Plan formed a ‘sum of individual plans’ 
                                                
183 Dalrymple, R, 2003, Continental drift: Australia’s search for a regional identity, Ashgate, England, Ch.1 
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(ECA), to oversee the Marshall Plan's economic and technical aid. 
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of development activities, rather than an integrated foreign aid program aimed at 
developing the economies, solving poverty or raising living standards. Funding for such 
plans was negotiated on a bilateral basis, with recipient governments devising and 
executing their own development programs. Such arrangements emphasised mutual 
assistance rather than ‘hand-outs’, with little to no expectation on recipients to return 
funds to the donors. 
With limited permanent employees, the Colombo Plan had no central administrative 
authority and no secretariat. Deliberations on economic and administrative issues were 
handled at annual meetings of the Colombo Plan Consultative Committee, comprising 
ministers representing member governments of the Plan. The Committee would review 
the scheme’s accomplishments during the preceding year, the difficulties and challenges 
encountered, and developmental changes made. Similarly, future tasks and possible 
problems were assessed, objectives and goals identified and likelihood of achieving set 
outcomes appraised. Its uniqueness, Gillett suggests, came from the fact that not “aid” 
but “cooperation” was its spirit, not formal organisation but flexibility its modus 
operandi, together with the absence of rules and limits to its activities.187  
The Colombo Plan comprised two main programs: the ‘Capital Development Program’, 
which funded major projects in agriculture, power and communications, and the 
‘Technical Cooperation Scheme’, which supplied equipment and capacity building – 
‘technical’ experts and the training of students. The Technical Cooperation Scheme 
became the most favoured by the Australian Government because: it generated its own 
momentum of economic and social advancement; it was easier to administer; outcomes 
were more visible and quicker to achieve; and it created good publicity for government 
ministers for local and media consumption.188 Indeed, in 1953 Australian High 
Commissioner to India, Walter Crocker, reported to Alan Watt, Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs (DEA), that ‘the best publicity we have received so far 
has been from students who have been studying in Australia. In fact I am inclined to 
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feel that the only political value which Australia has got out of its Colombo Plan efforts 
has been from the students.’189 
The goodwill generated from the training scheme also attracted increasing support from 
the Cabinet. Over the next ten years, the proportion of aid devoted to education, training 
and supply of equipment increased steadily from 22 percent in 1954/55 to 46 percent in 
1963/64.190 By 1970, the Colombo Plan budget was split equally between capital aid 
projects and technical assistance.  
 
Consolidation and Reform 
From 1950 to 1965, the Colombo Plan underwent a process of policy consolidation and 
reform. Three significant changes were undertaken: (1) administrative reform to further 
decentralise the policy infrastructure; (2) academic reform to tighten the selection 
process and ensure students completed within the allocated timeframe; and (3) welfare 
reform to establish support structures that minimised student failure and maximised 
their positive experience in Australia. 
1. Administrative reform 
The first significant reform involved reorganising the Colombo Plan’s administrative 
arrangements and establishing a proper bureaucratic system to deal with academic 
progress, reporting and statistics gathering. Since the Plan’s inception, student 
information and administration had been spread across various departments, making 
any coherent attempt at policy development difficult.191 Under such fragmented 
arrangement, each department conducted its own technical cooperation activities, which 
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frequently led to costly duplications and ad hoc administrative procedures.192 In 
September 1955, the Department of External Affairs (DEA) attempted to address the 
lack of coordination by pushing for a formal agreement with the various stakeholders. 
To be reviewed after two years, the agreement would be ‘brief and flexible’ and outline 
the administrative responsibilities of all participating agencies to the Plan. The 
agreement had two parts. Part I involved a ‘Common Services’ component that covered 
various allowances to Colombo Plan students. Part II, the ‘Administration of Training’, 
specified the program’s academic side such as course administration, unsatisfactory 
progress and progress reports for the Posts at embassies of the DEA.193 
Under the terms of the agreement, the DEA would be responsible for Administration of 
Training, while the agreement’s operational side, the Common Services, which included 
payment of allowances, reception, accommodation, the provision of English tuition and 
student orientation would be shifted to the Commonwealth Office of Education (COE). 
Such policy centralisation and operational diffusion would subsequently result in an 
increasing shift in the proportion of the Common Services, such as admission 
requirements and candidates’ selection, to other authorities including tertiary 
institutions.194 The administrative reform also helped reduce the ad hoc nature of the 
program’s administration, elevate its importance to Australian foreign policy, and 
confine the DEA’s role in providing ‘minimum service’, while other ‘training 
authorities took over certain commitments relating to their students’.195 
2. Academic reform 
The second reform of the Colombo Plan involved substantial changes to the academic 
administration of the program. In 1956, the COE commissioned a report on the 
academic progress of the Plan’s students at Australian universities. The report found a 
high failure rate among some overseas students with only 66.7 percent of 309 
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bachelor’s degree students having successfully passed their exams. Unlike students that 
studied under the colonial British education system,196 such as that of Malaya and 
Singapore, other cohorts of students had difficulties coping with the English language 
and adapting to a foreign culture, which resulted in students not completing their 
degrees within the allocated timeframe. 
Adding to the difficulties was the growing demand from domestic students and private 
fee paying overseas students for limited university places. During the three decades 
following the Second World War, local student demand for higher education underwent 
spectacular expansion, with numbers rising in 1945 from 15 585 to 273 137 by 1975.197 
In 1953, private fee paying overseas students from Asia outnumbered Colombo Plan 
scholars by five to one. By 1961, there were 3250 private overseas students compared to 
500 Colombo Plan scholars.198 Such demand placed considerable pressure on the higher 
education system to the extent that it prompted the DEA and COE to introduce 
mechanisms to ensure scholarship holders completed their degrees on time. The 
government introduced new policies to regulate satisfactory progress of all overseas 
students, improve English language support services, increase monitoring of student 
progress, tighten scholar restrictions and obligations, and impose stricter selection and 
enrolment standards. To alleviate the growing pressure on the higher education sector, 
the government also established more universities. In 1960 nine universities existed, 
within fifteen years there were eighteen in total.199 Table 3.1 provides a list of public 
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universities that were established since 1850 and the growth in numbers post-Second 
World War. 
 
Table 3.1: Public Universities in Australia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The growth in private overseas student numbers attracted the attention of the DEA, 
which feared that large numbers of private students would displace sponsored students, 
                                                
m - *RMIT (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology) was founded in 1887. In 1992, it was granted a 
‘public university’ status by the government of Victoria. 
University Year established as a 
public university 
The University of Sydney 1850 
The University of Melbourne 1853 
The University of Adelaide 1874 
University of Tasmania 1890 
The University of Queensland 1909 
The University of Western Australia 1911 
The Australian National University 1946 
The University of New South Wales 1949 
Monash University 1958 
Macquarie University 1964 
The University of Newcastle 1965 
Flinders University 1966 
La Trobe University 1967 
James Cook University 1970 
Griffith University 1971 
Deakin University 1974 
Murdoch University 1975 
University of Wollongong 1975 
Curtin University of Technology 1986 
The University of Western Sydney 1989 
Charles Sturt University 1989 
University of Canberra 1990 
Queensland University of 
Technology 
1990 
The University of South Australia 1991 
RMIT 1992* 
Swinburne University of Technology 1992 
Central Queensland of University 1992 
University of New England 1993 
Southern Cross University 1994 
University of Ballarat 1994 
University of Sunshine Coast 1994 
Victoria University 1998 
Charles Darwin University 2004 
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threatening to overtake the success of the Colombo Plan’s education and training 
program. To help restrict the number of students entering universities, the department 
proposed regulating the private student intake through a tighter selection process, 
making it easier to ‘permit the expansion in the number of sponsored students’ in 
universities’.200 Plans were also put in place by the department to increase the number 
of Colombo Plan students to 1000, with two-thirds attending universities. 
3. Welfare reform 
The third reform introduced by the government involved helping improve students’ 
experiences while studying in Australia. The early success of the Plan had come as a 
surprise to the government. In its attempt to expand the enrolment of sponsored 
students, the government failed to support the increase by providing adequate welfare 
and support services. In the first few years of the program, the DEA had difficulty 
accommodating and integrating newly arrived students into the academic and social 
community. Such difficulties had tragic consequences. Between 1950 and 1951, three 
Asian students studying at the University of Western Australia committed suicide and 
another suffered a mental breakdown as a result of social isolation.201  
The welfare neglect had become such a tense issue for policy-makers that at one stage it 
threatened to derail the Overseas Students Program. Raising his concerns in July 1951, 
Richard Casey, Minister for External Affairs, highlighted the issue with Prime Minister 
Robert Menzies: ‘My department has for some time been concerned that 
accommodation difficulties, problems of orientation and a good deal of ordinary 
loneliness may not only lead to occasional instances of personal tragedy, but also leave 
the way open to Communist influences’.202 
In dealing with the welfare issue, the government began to take a greater interest in the 
welfare concerns of overseas students, allocating for example £A50 000 of Colombo 
Plan finance to build hostels for international students. In 1957 construction of an 
International House began in Melbourne, with new houses subsequently built at the 
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University of Sydney and the University of New South Wales. Meanwhile, community 
based hospitality organisations such as Rotary, Lions, Apex and the Jaycees grew in 
numbers. Operating independently of the government, these groups began playing an 
active role in providing a range of programs that involved host schemes and student 
exchanges.  
By the mid to late fifties, the Department of External Affairs had decided to leverage 
and shift welfare responsibilities for overseas students to the growing number of private 
community organisations. The shift in welfare responsibilities came largely in response 
to Casey’s push for maximum community involvement in Australia’s ‘good neighbour’ 
policy, and urging the creation of Australia – Asian associations to serve as rallying 
points ‘for those many people who have goodwill towards people of Asia but who now 
have no means of expressing themselves’.203 New associations such as the Coordinating 
Committee for the Welfare of Overseas Students (CCWOS) led by local community 
leaders began emerging in Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia, Queensland 
and South Australia. These coordinating committees brought together the ‘function of 
the middle class community’ organisations across Australia to play a critical role in 
mobilising welfare and community support for the overseas students program. Such 
government support for community involvement would, however, diminish in the 
eighties as the political imperative influencing the government’s education aid 
commitment was gradually overtaken by the economic imperative of education 
commercialisation. 
The Colombo Plan formed the foundations for the development of a formal Overseas 
Students Program. The OSP underwent three significant consolidations and reforms – 
administrative, academic and welfare – to achieve greater policy coordination, better 
academic outcomes and improved student experiences. 
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FROM EDUCATION AID TO EDUCATION EXPANSION 
In 1972, the Liberal Coalition’s twenty-three years in government ended. After years in 
the ‘political wilderness’, the election of Gough Whitlam’s Labor government signalled 
far-reaching changes to Australia’s education system generally, and overseas students’ 
participation particularly. Education’s popularity as an electoral issue had made it a 
central platform of Labor’s election campaign, forming a fundamental part of its social 
reform agenda while driving the party’s ambitious higher education reform program. 
After winning the federal election, the new Labor government introduced a number of 
important changes that would continue to increase an already expanding education 
system initiated by the previous Liberal government. 
Firstly, the government assumed total financial responsibility for all universities and 
colleges of advanced education from 1 January 1974. The share of total government 
funding increased by a remarkable 41.9 percent between 1975 and 1976.204 The role of 
the public sector expanded to accommodate the already growing function of the 
government in education. In 1968 the national education bureaucracy almost doubled. 
Six years later it multiplied, increasing from 397 to 2990 staff and reaching a high point 
in 1976 of 3357.205 Secondly, government spending on education increased all 
Commonwealth outlays from 4.4 percent in 1972 to 8.5 percent in 1975. The number of 
tertiary places available expanded from 211 045 in 1972 to 273 137 a year later. 
Thirdly, on 1 January 1974, the government abolished tuition fees for all full-time, part-
time and external students, including overseas students at tertiary institutions and 
technical colleges. Finally, it approved the construction of new higher education 
facilities, making the University of Wollongong autonomous, allowing Murdoch 
University and Griffith University to admit their first students and endorsing plans for 
Deakin University.206 
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By 1971 the overseas students program had not only become an ingrained and 
significant part of Australia’s foreign policy agenda, but it had also gradually shifted 
closer to the core of Australia’s higher education planning and development. The 
increased investment in higher education infrastructure in the early sixties following the 
Commonwealth Government’s inquiry (Martin Committee) in 1964, played an 
important part in contributing to the expansion of the overseas students program and 
creating additional places to meet overseas demand. In 1962 out of a total of 12 049 
overseas students studying in Australia, about 3895 were sponsored and private students 
studying at tertiary institutions.207 Within 10 years, the number of tertiary overseas 
students increased from 3895 to 6300 with a majority studying at five universities – 
University of New South Wales (1330), Monash University (655), University of 
Melbourne (638), University of Sydney (626), and University of Western Australia 
(622).208 See Figure 3.1 for number of overseas students in Australian universities since  
1959. 
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Figure 3.1: Number of Overseas Students in Australian Universities209 
 
 
Two-tier system 
By 1972, a formal Overseas Students Program with a two-tier system had developed; 
the private overseas students scheme, which provided a full-cost basis educational 
access to students from developing countries and the sponsorship program which 
involved scholarship students under the Colombo Plan, bilateral, multilateral and home 
country scholarship schemes. The private and sponsored programs each had their own 
distinct features.  
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Private overseas students were the dominant cohort studying in Australian higher 
education institutions. By 1966, they outnumbered students under the various sponsored 
schemes by about ten to one.210 The majority of students came from Malaysia, 
Singapore and Hong Kong, accounting for about 80 percent of the total private overseas 
student population. These students received no official backing from their governments. 
They enrolled by direct personal application to Australian institutions; they provided 
their own financial resources to travel; they covered their accommodation and living 
expenses while studying; and the courses they enrolled in were predominantly business 
and engineering related. 
The sponsored students, on the other hand, were funded by the Australian Government, 
international organisations or home countries. They came from a wider range of 
countries and were required to enrol in courses – such as education, engineering, 
agriculture, medicine and public administration – that were specifically relevant to their 
country’s development needs. Scholarships funds covered their accommodation and 
living expenses. 
The commonalities between both programs were in the academic and visa requirements. 
Academic administration required sponsored and private students to meet tight 
admissions criteria and maintain adequate progress during the course of their studies. 
The visa administrative system stipulated that students must return home upon 
completion of their program. Ongoing tightening of administrative and visa 
arrangements, combined with an increase in academic and welfare support provided by 
educational institutions and community groups, had indeed ensured that the majority of 
overseas students were completing their studies on time and returning home. According 
to government reports, in the 1970s sponsored overseas students were achieving a 
‘satisfactory’ pass rate result of over 80 percent at the annual examinations of 
Australian universities.211 
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Whitlam’s reform of education aid 
By 1973, education aid, especially the training of large numbers of overseas students, 
continued to yield tremendous diplomatic returns to government policy. The Prime 
Minister’s deep personal commitment towards overseas aid and the ‘progress and 
development of the region’ also gave the program added influence.212 Two primary 
objectives formed Whitlam’s aid agenda: to improve the quality of assistance provided 
and increase the volume of Australian aid. 
In his first term, Whitlam undertook a series of important policy changes to the aid 
program. Until 1975, aid policy and administration remained decentralised and 
uncoordinated: the Department of Territories (defunct in 1973) administered aid to 
Papua New Guinea; the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (previously External 
Affairs) directed bilateral and multilateral aid; the Treasury handled aid to international 
financial institutions such as the Asia Development Bank (ADB); while the Department 
of Education managed the overseas students program. Under such arrangements, 
departments invested considerable interest into the administration of their individual aid 
programs to the extent that in a bureaucratic and highly competitive environment, 
strategic policy planning became difficult as each contested for policy influence and 
increased program funding. 
Part of the aid reform involved establishing a single centralised statutory agency to 
manage and administer all international development activities.213 The decision to 
reorganise the administration of the aid under a single statutory authority stems 
primarily from the government’s desire ‘to downgrade (but not remove) the overtly 
political nature of Australian aid, to upgrade its impact on development, to 
professionalise its practice, to increase its volume and to unify its administration’.214 As 
an interim measure, the government established the Office of Australian Development 
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Assistance Agency under the Department of Foreign Affairs.215 Within a year, the 
government replaced the Office with a newly established Australian Development 
Assistance Agency (ADAA) with responsibilities for administering all bilateral and 
multilateral aid to developing countries.216 The government transferred the 
administration of the Colombo Plan to the ADAA and handed the management of the 
private overseas students program to the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs 
– which also handled visa processing arrangements. To direct the development of the 
overseas students program, the government established a standing Inter-departmental 
Committee comprising the DIEA, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the 
Department of Education. 
The government also expanded the scope of its educational assistance to building 
institutional capacity of regional education institutions and increasing assistance 
through bilateral and multilateral arrangements. In Indonesia, the government assisted 
the Ministry of Education and Culture with planning vocational training programs for 
technical teachers and administrators. In Singapore the Colombo Plan funded 
equipment and advice on curriculum planning at the Jurong Vocational Institute and 
medical degree examinations at the University of Singapore. Australia became an 
associate member of the South East Asian Ministers of Education Organisation 
(SEAMEO) on 27 August 1973, contributing $86 000 to SEAMEO’s resources in 
1973/74 and $33 000 to the Colombo Plan training awards for the organisation’s 
regional training centres.217 In tandem with its increased educational assistance, ‘third 
country’ awards and fellowships were offered to developing countries, allowing their 
students to study in another country, apart from Australia, within the Colombo Plan 
region. This offering helped relieve some of the existing pressures placed on limited 
Australian higher education places. 
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PROGRAM CONSOLIDATION 
In the push to reorganise the overseas students program in 1973, the government 
consolidated its private and sponsored students into a unified scheme. Though the 
Colombo Plan was considered the ‘shoehorn’ of Australia’s diplomatic relations with 
the Asia Pacific region with more that 13 000 students participating in the program 
since its inception in 1950, the private overseas students numbers were even more 
striking. In 1972 alone, more than 10 000 private students studied in Australian 
institutions. Since 1950 over 20 000 overseas students have studied in Australia.218 
Recognising the private overseas student potential in creating ‘good relations and 
cultural exchange,’ the government elevated its status to an important part of its foreign 
policy agenda by making three significant changes. First, the government abolished 
tertiary fees in 1974 for all private overseas students in universities, colleges and 
schools. The government absorbed the cost of $9.2 million in private student subsidies 
to educational institutions believing that the benefits of these growing and potentially 
strategic alumni outweighed the annual cost in government subsidy. Second, the 
government increased the private students quota from 6300 to 10 000. The quota would 
control the anticipated influx of private overseas students, while safeguarding against 
the potential displacement of local students.219 Third, private overseas students would 
be allowed to remain in Australia if they met the normal migration criteria. Sponsored 
students, on the other hand, were obliged to return home and ‘make the skills acquired 
in the course of their studies and training available for economic and social 
development of their homelands.’220 The decision to allow private overseas students to 
remain in the country would be part of an intentional commitment by the government to 
dispel the stigma of racism associated with the White Australia Policy.221 Moreover, the 
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Prime Minister believed that despite loosening migration regulations most students 
would indeed return home upon completion of their course: 
As in the past, I expect that most private students will continue 
to see their future in their own homelands. We have been 
inclined to exaggerate the attraction of Australia to the young 
people of other countries. The ties of family and friends, their 
obligations to their fellow countrymen and their own natural 
attachment to the land of their birth will draw most of the 
students home when their studies are completed.222 
Indeed, students remaining in Australia as a result of marriages to Australians were less 
than two percent of the total number of sponsored students in the 1970s.223 
 
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENTS AND NATIONAL RESPONSE 
By the mid-seventies, the ‘overseas student question’ was clearly becoming a pressing 
issue for the major providers of higher education – the United States, the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Canada – to the extent that the tendency towards 
‘education protectionism’ seemed inescapable.224  
On 12 December 1979, the British House of Lords met to debate the new Conservative 
Government’s policy decision to impose full fees for all overseas students studying in 
the United Kingdom. The government, led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, 
justified its radical fee policy based on the need to cut public expenditure and the 
subsidisation of overseas students by an estimated total of £127m. Moves to overhaul 
the program were largely instigated by a six-month study completed a year before by 
officials from the Department of Education and Science, the Ministry of Overseas 
Development, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Home Office, the Treasury 
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and the Department of Trade.225 Previous attempts at reining in the striking rise in 
overseas students by imposing quotas and charging differential fees were unsuccessful; 
so unsuccessful that higher education institutions had been educating 5000 more 
overseas students than provided under the recurrent grant (while local students were 
5000 below target) and the total higher education system had 8600 (17 percent) more 
overseas students than provided for.226 In 1973 the government’s Expenditure 
Committee Report proposed the implementation of full-cost fees; however, that attempt 
failed. Little was done to take up the Committee’s recommendation except to increase 
the overseas students’ fees annually from 1975 to 1979 and introduce new types of fees 
in 1977/78 for undergraduate and postgraduate studies.227 
Two major influencing factors emerged: the global economic downturn and rising 
demand for foreign education services. The rapidly deteriorating global economy began 
imposing pressure on all major higher education destinations to find new ways of 
cutting public expenditure. The turning point in policy occurred in 1974 when the worst 
economic slump since the Second World War disrupted the extraordinary growth of the 
postwar years and shattered the Keynesian policy consensus228 – a policy consensus, 
which largely underwrote the postwar ‘massification’ in higher education and aided the 
expansion of education aid. Coupled with the economic slump was the extraordinary 
expansion in global demand for foreign education. Student mobility was becoming a 
worldwide phenomenon, so that by 1980 more than a million overseas students were 
studying in foreign education institutions229 compared to a quarter of a million students 
twenty years previous to that.230 In Britain, the number of overseas students doubled in 
the 1960s and trebled during the 1970s.231 In the United States, the number of post-
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secondary foreign students increased from 53 107 in 1960 to 325 628 in 1980, and in 
France foreign student numbers grew from 27 132 to 114 181.232 (See Table 3.2)  
 
Table 3.2: Trend in International Tertiary Students in Host Countries, 1977 to 
1993 – Enrolments of International Students233 
 
 1977 1982 1987 1993 
United States 235 544 326 299 356 190 449 745 
France 104 317 110 763 123 978 139 562 
Germany 54 062 71 393 81 724 116 474 
United Kingdom 58 563 50 684 53 694 95 594 
Australia 8258 12 104 16 075 42 415 
 
In response to a deteriorating global economy and a rising demand for foreign 
education, the British embarked on a full fee program; the United States and Canada 
attempted to regulate overseas student enrolment by imposing substantial tuition fees, 
while France and Germany resisted the tuition fees option, choosing instead to tighten 
the admission standards and impose strict quotas. What seemed universal, however, was 
the recognition by governments of the need to develop a national policy framework to 
deal with the rapid growth of students studying abroad. Increasing fees, tightening 
admissions and imposing quotas may have presented short-term solutions to the 
immediate policy challenge, but it did little to address the emerging structural and 
supply issues created by growing demand for education services. 
One clear repercussion of the short-term measures was its noticeable impact on 
Australia’s overseas students program. By the mid to late seventies, foreign demand for 
Australian educational services had returned to growth, increasing further the pressure 
on educational institutions’ places and government coffers. Demand from the 
Malaysians, the largest block of private overseas students, had nearly doubled from 
3139 in 1976 to 6016 in 1983. Hong Kong, the second largest group had more than 
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tripled from 421 in 1976 to 1388 by 1983.234 The increase in overseas students in 
Australia is not surprising. Given the small number of ‘Anglophone host countries’, a 
policy change in one country, Philip Jones points out, can have implications for others. 
Fee increases in Britain in 1979, more than any other single factor, had two striking 
impacts on Australia. It firstly ‘helped shape attitudes and policies’ for its Overseas 
Students Program, and it ‘guaranteed Australia’s increasing attractiveness as an 
education destination’.235  
Under the Whitlam government, the OSP underwent further expansion with 
development of a delineated two-tier program. Recognising the foreign policy 
advantage of the OSP, Whitlam elevated the private overseas students element of the 
program by abolishing their tuition fees, increasing their quota to 10 000 and allowing 
private students to remain in Australia after their studies. The changing global economic 
climate would, however, challenge Whitlam’s policy, reshaping subsequent 
governments’ policy thinking and attitudes towards the overseas students question. 
 
FROM EDUCATION EXPANSION TO EDUCATION SUBSIDY 
During 1974–75, the Australian economy suffered similar problems to those 
experienced internationally: declining growth, high inflation and high unemployment.236 
Labor’s generous and even-handed financial policies for tertiary education, Andrew 
Spaull observed, turned sour in 1975.237  
The shift in Labor’s fiscal policy in mid-1975 meant that the 
honeymoon was over for education, and especially for tertiary 
education. Once the decision was made to heed Treasury advice 
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and reduce public spending, education would be one of the first 
targets.  After all, its budget was now very high, relative to pre-
1972 levels, indeed it was over $1600 million in 1974-75 which 
is more than defence expenditure.238   
The government made financial cutbacks across the tertiary education sector. In 1975, 
the Labor government initiated an inter-departmental review of the overseas students 
program to address the growing fiscal problems. However, the constitutional crisis and 
the ‘sacking’ of the Whitlam government stalled the review. 
Under the new Liberal-National Coalition government led by Prime Minister Malcolm 
Fraser, the government sought to address the economic malaise by introducing fiscal 
tightening to reduce the public deficit and curb spending. Higher education, a largely 
funded Commonwealth initiative and directly regulated by national fiscal strategies bore 
the initial brunt of the government’s reform.239 New tightening measures were 
introduced: postgraduate awards were reduced in number, tuition fees for students 
undertaking second and higher degrees other than combined courses were reintroduced, 
and student numbers for 1977-78 were capped at the 1976 level.240 While university 
enrolments were restricted, the numbers of young persons completing secondary 
education continued to grow, consequently increasing competition for limited university 
places.241 
 
ATTEMPTS AT POLICY REFORM 
In April 1976, the Fraser government reinstituted the Inter-Departmental Committee 
(IDC) – comprising the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (DIEA), the 
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Education (DoE) – to 
review the overseas students program. The attempt at formulating a new direction failed 
after two years of lengthy debates and no clear consensus. Advocating for more 
migration regulatory controls with fewer foreign policy and aid considerations, the 
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DIEA argued that the program was ‘not fulfilling its objectives and was increasingly 
being abused by students to gain back-door migrant entry.’ To mitigate such abuse, 
immigration officials recommended that the ‘entire program should be seen as another 
form of temporary entry policy and should no longer be regarded as a means of 
influencing Australia’s relationships with other countries.’242 The DFA on the other 
hand pressed to maintain the foreign policy emphasis, arguing instead for a balanced 
approach to aid with foreign policy aims remaining while tightening migration 
regulatory controls. Overseas students, the DFA argued, fulfilled ‘valuable foreign 
policy and aid objectives.’243 It was indeed this continued recognition of the diplomatic 
returns from overseas student training that helped ensure its continued prominence 
within the aid program.244 For the next two years the continuation of a foreign policy 
emphasis seems to have prevailed. 
By the end of the decade Australia’s policy of domestic insulation from the global 
economy was no longer tenable.245 In 1979, the Fraser government decided to 
commission a ‘fresh’ review of the private overseas student policy. On this occasion the 
review would involve the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the 
Department of Finance in the consultation process. The participation of both 
departments meant that the scope of the review would be expanded to include fiscal 
matters other than immigration and foreign policy to reflect growing economic 
concerns. 
Five significant outcomes emerged from the review. First, it saw a fresh acceptance of 
the foreign policy, aid and cultural relations benefits from increased student mobility.246 
Second, the limit of 10 000 on overseas student numbers would be removed and 
replaced by unofficial country quotas – referred to as ‘guaranteed student approvals’. 
The quotas would reflect the degree of importance attached to countries in the area of 
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foreign relations.247 Third, an Overseas Students Charge (OSC), framed as a visa levy 
and representing about 10 percent of the notional full cost of a university place, would 
be introduced and increased gradually to recuperate government revenue. The OSC 
would range from $1500 to $2500 per annum and the revenue, collected before the 
issue and renewal of student visas, would go into the government’s consolidated 
revenue. Fourth, secondary school students would now be permitted to study in 
Australia on a subsidised fee basis. Last, all overseas students would be required to 
return home for at least two years after completing their studies before being eligible to 
apply for migrant entry to Australia.  
Most of the key elements of the review did not attract any major opposition. In fact the 
‘return home’ policy had a swift and considerable effect. In the 1970s, an estimated 75 
percent of private overseas students were granted permanent residency; by 1983, that 
figure had fallen to less than 10 percent.248 The only element that attracted controversy 
involved the introduction of the overseas students charge. There are those who suggest 
that growing fears of migration exploitation had led to the new charges.249 The DIEA’s 
strident advocacy of full-cost recovery did indeed reflect the department’s hardline 
position on the overseas students program. Immigration abuse by overseas students did 
continue to underline the department’s argument for a complete program overhaul. By 
proposing an extreme measure, such as placing greater requirement on students to 
contribute to the cost of their education, the DIEA believed that such measures would 
inevitably close the ‘back-door’ migrant entry.250 Such arguments were indeed 
influential in guiding the outcome of the review; however, the fiscal problems 
influenced by global economic changes played an equally important role in shaping the 
overall policy reorientation. 
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POLICY COMPROMISE 
The outcome of the review in fact reflected a policy compromise between proponents of 
‘full-cost’ recovery, the ‘free-educationist’ lobby, the ‘border-control’ and the ‘foreign-
policy’ groups. The Report of the Committee of Review of Private Overseas Student 
Policy offers some clues to the key arguments that eventually led to the government’s 
decision on charges. In the lead-up to the 1979 changes, the charges issue had been one 
of considerable contention in inter-departmental discussions. On one end of the policy 
spectrum stood the DIEA, which advocated full-cost recovery for all overseas students. 
The Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Department of Finance favoured 
a less extreme option, pushing instead for a charge which would help recoup the cost of 
education. Whether it was ‘more appropriate to assess the cost of overseas students at 
average or marginal cost’ was the subject of the debate.251 While raising no objections 
in principle to the introduction of charges, the Department of Foreign Affairs on the 
other hand wanted the charges at a level that would not deter overseas students from 
coming to Australia. The only opposition came from the Department of Education, 
which ‘opposed the imposition of charges on the grounds that there should be no 
discrimination between Australian and overseas students.’252  
The divergence in views led, at least in the short term, to a compromise where foreign 
policy, immigration concerns and cost subsidisation emerged as a reformed national 
framework for the program. It was eventually agreed, at least in practice, that ‘so long 
as overseas students were considered to be occupying only marginal places in the 
education system, it was reasonable to charge them something considerably less than 
average cost.’253 To placate immigration concerns, the compromise involved giving 
DIEA greater control over collecting the new levy on overseas students studying 
primarily in universities and colleges of advanced education as they entered Australia. 
This arrangement de-centralised the management of the OSP across two departments 
and an agency – the Department of Immigration would be responsible for all private 
overseas students; the Department of Education would be responsible for the 
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administrative arrangements of the OSP; and the Australian Development Assistance 
Agency (ADAB) would be responsible for all sponsored students. 
Though the ‘full-cost recovery’ faction254 did not gain much traction in the Fraser 
government, it did begin to gain a foothold with the overseas students program. The 
program with an annual estimated total expenditure of more than $83 million255 needed 
to be curbed, without substantially reneging on Australia’s aid responsibility. The 
decision to charge overseas students would help the government recoup $12 million in 
visa fees.256 That amount was anticipated to increase to $16.2 million in 1982-83 and 
$25.6 million in 1983-84.257  
 
FROM EDUCATION SUBSIDY TO EDUCATION TRADE 
When the Hawke Labor government came to power in March 1983, the economy was in 
serious trouble. In response to a deteriorating situation the government’s economic 
strategy moved to reinvigorate the national economy by stripping away policies and 
practices insulating Australia from international competition.258 The government 
believed that by diversifying Australia’s exports, liberalising its capital and deregulating 
its currency it would invariably drive economic growth. Labor worked through a market 
liberal reform agenda, picking first those issues that impacted least adversely on its 
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‘core constituency’.259 Education aid represented a policy area that not only required 
drastic changes to flexibly respond to international demands for limited tertiary places, 
but also signified a politically soft target with minimal public opposition towards any 
radical changes. 
On advice from the Department of Education and Youth Affairs, the government 
introduced quotas to limit the number of private overseas students entering tertiary 
institutions to a maximum of 1500, while only 2000 students were allowed into 
secondary schools.260 The government also introduced in the 1983/84 Federal Budget, 
the Overseas Students Charge Amendment Bill to increase student fees. Both actions 
were in direct response to perceived failures of Fraser’s reform measures and were 
aimed at containing the rapid expansion of the overseas students program. Fraser’s 
introduction of the subsidy scheme had in fact created little respite in foreign demand 
pressures on Australian education. His removal of the 10 000 overseas student quotas 
led to a dramatic rise in the number of private overseas students seeking education 
opportunities in Australia. In fact the number of overseas students enrolled in tertiary 
institutions more than doubled from 6745 in 1979 to 13 047 in 1984.261 
The rapid rise in student numbers had considerable impact on higher education 
institutions. Fraser’s failure to integrate fully the overseas students program into the 
overall national education planning had intensified pressures on tertiary institutions 
already struggling for limited resources. The increased student presence produced two 
striking effects. First it led to an uneven distribution of overseas students concentrated 
at certain institutions. In 1983, higher degree overseas students at Monash University 
comprised 10.8 percent, with undergraduates at 12.9 percent. At the University of New 
South Wales, higher degree students stood at 15 percent and undergraduates at 13.2 
percent.262 (See Table 3.3 and 3.4) Second, the high numbers of overseas students in 
some institutions had resulted in heavy concentration in some courses. In a University 
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of New South Wales survey undertaken in 1983, overseas undergraduates formed 23.3 
percent of total enrolments within the Faculty of Architecture, 24.6 percent in 
engineering. This is in comparison to 9.2 percent and 11.5 percent respectively three 
years earlier.263  
 
Table 3.3: Higher Degree Overseas Students in Universities 1982 and 1983264 
 Overseas students as percentage total 
Universities 1982 1983 
Adelaide 10.2 15.6 
Australian National 
University 
36.1 36.7 
Deakin 2.8 3.2 
Flinders 6.4 6.3 
Griffith 7.6 9.2 
James Cook 12.7 11.7 
La Trobe 5.3 5.0 
Macquarie 4.9 4.3 
Melbourne 7.3 8.0 
Monash 9.5 10.8 
Murdoch 2.8 1.9 
New England 11.1 12.9 
NSW 14.6 15.0 
Newcastle 9.4 12.3 
Queensland 10.3 10.6 
Sydney 6.9 7.6 
Tasmania 8.5 9.7 
WA 7.0 7.6 
Wollongong 8.4 8.2 
TOTAL 9.9 10.6 
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Table 3.4: Other than Higher Degree Overseas Students in Universities 1982 and 
1983265 
 Overseas students as percentage total 
Universities 1982 1983 
Adelaide 3.7 4.3 
Australian National 
University 
4.2 5.3 
Deakin 4.9 5.0 
Flinders 2.2 2.9 
Griffith 1.4 1.6 
James Cook 2.9 3.2 
La Trobe 5.6 6.2 
Macquarie 2.9 4.1 
Melbourne 5.1 5.4 
Monash 12.9 12.9 
Murdoch 0.8 0.9 
New England 2.3 2.5 
NSW 11.8 13.2 
Newcastle 5.3 7.8 
Queensland 2.4 2.5 
Sydney 2.8 2.5 
Tasmania 4.1 4.8 
WA 5.0 5.4 
Wollongong 2.3 3.4 
TOTAL 5.2 5.7 
 
Fraser’s reform measures also had an indirect impact on universities. The decision to 
ease entry restrictions for secondary students meant junior secondary level students 
were now permitted to study in Australia. This led to a dramatic rise in secondary 
enrolments between 1982 and 1983, creating a large overrun of student numbers and a 
bottleneck effect. The rise in secondary schools came particularly from Malaysian 
students. Malaysian students studying in secondary schools increased from 457 in 1976 
to 3191 in 1983. More Malaysians viewed secondary education as an alternative and 
less competitive route to tertiary study. The raised expectations invariably led to a 
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bottleneck effect and pressure for more places to be made available since 85 percent of 
overseas students completing Year 12 proceeded to tertiary study. Such strains led the 
Minister for Industry and Commerce, Senator John Button to argue: ‘If we are to 
control future intakes into tertiary institutions it necessarily follows that we must now 
control secondary school intakes’.266 In November 1983, the Labor government passed  
legislation limiting the number of overseas students for the 1984 intake to a total of 
4000 enrolled at Australian institutions – 2500 overseas students completing their 
secondary education in Australia and 1500 overseas students directly entering tertiary 
institutions.267 The total represents an increase of only 400 students over 1983, the 
lowest number in the previous 25 years. 
 
JACKSON AND GOLDRING REPORTS 
Following the fee increase and quota restrictions, the government commissioned two 
committees to review the overseas students and Australia’s aid programs. The Goldring 
Committee, chaired by John Goldring, Professor of Law from Macquarie University, 
examined the extent to which the private overseas student program served Australia’s 
interest in the areas of immigration, trade, education, development assistance, 
international understanding and cultural exchange.268 While Sir Gordon Jackson, 
chairing the Committee to review the Australian Overseas Aid Program and supported 
by six other members, mainly from commercial interests and economists, considered 
the trade benefits of Australia’s aid program in which education assistance represented a 
small yet important part.269 
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The Goldring and Jackson Committees offered antithetical responses.270 Goldring 
recommended a non-controversial and more conservative approach to the development 
of the overseas students program. The report did not favour the commercial 
development of education but recommended instead continuing the subsidised scheme 
with a higher overseas students charge fixed at a proportion of the actual cost of 
individual places. It also recommended quotas for institutions and courses, a merit-
based system of selecting subsidised students, and a planned approach to integrating the 
overseas students program into the national education planning and funding.271 Philip 
Jones suggests that the Goldring Report, with its cautious and pragmatic approach, 
would not have caused much excitement in educational, government and community 
circles. ‘It had attempted to do the right thing by all interested parties, especially 
overseas and Australian students.’272 
The Jackson Committee on the other hand recommended a less conservative approach. 
The report argued for the commercialisation of education as an export service. 
‘International trade in Australian education services had the potential as a significant 
new industry for Australia, that a deregulated industry would maximise industry 
competitiveness, and that existing subsidies constituted a form of protectionism and 
should be abandoned.’273 To realise its radical goal, the committee advocated a duality 
approach to aid, offering proposals for an expanded and more explicit aid program to 
run in parallel with a market approach in education promotions. Further, the number 
and types of scholarships should be increased to meet development assistance aims, full 
fees introduced to cover the ‘full economic cost’ of students’ education, government 
protection removed and competition introduced in the tertiary education sector for 
overseas students. 
The Jackson recommendations attracted considerable support from segments of the 
political community. During its deliberation on challenges and opportunities in 
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Australia and ASEAN relations, the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
considered, among other issues, the topic of overseas students in the context of the 
Jackson and Goldring reports. Chaired by the Hon. W.L. Morrison, the Morrison Report 
proposed a number of changes. Firstly, that the government introduce a gradual and 
predictable increase in the overseas students charge to reach a level of operating costs as 
determined by the government. Secondly, enrolling institutions should be allowed to 
retain overseas students’ fees to assist in funding additional places and as an incentive 
to attract more students. Thirdly, there should be a comprehensive system of 
scholarships to be funded by the aid budget and parallel the development of the fees 
program.274  
The report also went further than Jackson’s recommendations, arguing that the 
education sector should be seen as the ‘forerunner of an augmented business and 
diplomatic push in the ASEAN region.’275 Australia should be sensitive to the long-term 
aspirations of Asian countries by not disturbing the ‘safety valve functions’ performed 
by its educational resources in providing access to ethnic groups marginalised by home 
country national policies. In effect, the Morrison Report was an early expression of the 
philosophy of integrating educational exports with trade and foreign policy into a 
focused attempt to become part of South-East Asia.276 
The Opposition Coalition parties effectively embraced the Jackson Report’s contentious 
recommendation for full fees, suggesting that ‘the Jackson Committee has taken, we 
think, a more adventurous course. We think it has come up with a more definitive 
solution to the problem.’277 The Opposition advocated opening up an opportunity for 
overseas students to ‘pay their way’ for an education in Australia, when they would 
already be paying full fees in North America and the United Kingdom. Allowing full 
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fees, they believed, would also help solve the ‘displacement problem’, if the money 
generated from fees could be ‘applied back to education to provide extra places’.278 
 
UNIVERSITIES’ RESPONSE  
Following the recommendations of the Jackson Report, the Minister for Trade, later 
Education, continually exhorted universities to look to the ‘export of education services’ 
as a means of creating new tertiary jobs and assisting the country’s balance of trade.279 
Most universities responded coldly to the Jackson report. At a dinner with 19 vice 
chancellors of the major universities held at the Australian National University, the 
Secretary of the Department of Trade, Mr John Menadue, spoke about the Department’s 
thinking and plans for the export of educational services.  
I outlined the ways in which I though we could promote 
educational services offshore and encourage more Asian 
students to come to Australia. The Americans and British have 
been doing it very successfully. We were not serious 
competitors. With the universities under financial pressure, this 
was a commercial opportunity for them. It would also transform 
university campuses and, hopefully, student attitudes towards 
Asia.280 
The dinner, John Menadue found out, ‘turned to frost’. ‘The vice-chancellors were not 
impressed with my commercialism.’281 The main criticism came from Professor Peter 
Karmel, vice-chancellor of the ANU. ‘He was upset at commercially exploiting 
educational services on such a scale.’282  
                                                
278 ibid. 
279 Smart, D, 1989, Education, Ch. 12, in Head, W.B., & Patience, A., (eds.), From Fraser to Hawke, 
Longman Cheshire, Melbourne 
280 Menadue, J, 1999, Things you learn along the way, David Lovell Publishing, Melbourne, pp. 245 - 246 
281 ibid. 
282 ibid. p. 246 
 96 
Opposition to the marketisation of education was not universal. Some sections of the 
higher education sector foresaw ‘a rosy future as international entrepreneurs.’283 In 
Western Australia, Murdoch University in alliance with the state’s trade agency, EXIM 
Corporation Ltd, put in motion plans to build and run a private university targeting only 
private Asian students.284 The Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology (RMIT) began 
developing and promoting full fee programs. By July 1986, RMIT had in place a 
proposal to offer a full fee Bachelor of Business in Accountancy degree course in 
Malaysia. The program would be controlled by RMIT staff and conducted on the basis 
of two academic years in Kuala Lumpur and the final academic year in Melbourne.’285 
Even challenging the universities’ sector monopoly over granting of degrees, the West 
Australian Institute of Technology, a College of Advanced Education, entered the full 
fee fray with an aggressive push into South-East Asia.286 
The government however had great difficulty wrestling with the two antithetical reports. 
It opted instead for a middle lane approach, melding aspects of Goldring with Jackson 
recommendations. The approach would involve incorporating the Goldring 
recommendations for the sponsored and subsidy program, while the Jackson 
recommendation of a user-pay system would be introduced as an addition to the 
existing program in the form of full fees. 
 
SHIFT TO EDUCATION EXPORT 
On 22 March 1985, the Minister for Education, Senator Susan Ryan, announced 
preliminary yet radical changes to the Overseas Student Policy. The government would 
impose an ‘annual ceiling’ on all overseas students. Institutions would be allowed to 
enrol overseas students up to ten percent of their total number, and up to 20 percent in 
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any course, within the overall ceiling. The Overseas Students Charge was increased, so 
that it represented 35 percent of the full cost of a place in 1986, and 45 percent of the 
full cost of a place in 1987 for undergraduate and postgraduate students. And to provide 
increased opportunities for overseas students wishing to study in Australia but who 
were not able to be accommodated within the quota of students to be subsidised by the 
government, institutions would be able to offer places at full cost in courses, separate 
from their normal degree and diploma offerings specifically designed for overseas 
students.287 
Within six months of Senator Ryan’s announcement, Federal Cabinet decided on a 
radical strategy to develop the export of the Australian education services industry. Two 
sectors would emerge: formal and informal. The formal sector would comprise the 
public and private secondary schools, universities and Colleges of Technical and 
Further Education (TAFE), while the informal sector would be made up of private 
colleges and institutes offering non-accredited university courses such as English 
language, tourism management and secretarial studies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to map the transformation of Australia’s overseas students 
program from its beginning in 1950 until 1985. Its main purpose is to introduce the 
shifting institutional policies governing the development of education aid and its 
transformation to education trade. Under the Colombo Plan, the program enjoyed 
considerable interest and bipartisan political support. In 1972, the program underwent 
far-reaching changes, becoming an important part of Australia’s foreign policy and 
progressively shifting closer towards the core of higher education planning. A two-tier 
system had developed with the private overseas students scheme gaining importance 
and popularity. By the mid-seventies however, global developments had to a large 
extent undermined the program’s original aid objectives. Around the world, developed 
nations quickly moved to introduce protectionist measures in an attempt to reduce 
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global demand pressures on their higher education resources, which inevitably had a 
direct impact on Australia’s higher education system.  
In the late seventies, Malcolm Fraser’s government introduced policy measures to ease 
the mounting strain on the higher education system. The government’s response, in 
retrospect, failed to fully integrate the overseas students program into its overall 
national education thinking, further intensifying instead of relieving pressure on tertiary 
institutions already struggling for limited resources. In 1983, when the Hawke Labor 
government came to power, it moved quickly to address the problem by pursuing a 
bipartisan, yet controversial policy prescription. The government proposed to gradually 
remove education subsidies and encourage commercialisation of the overseas students 
program. Market solutions imposed on the overseas student part of the higher education 
system was instrumental in radically transforming the program into a multi-billion 
dollar export education services sector and significantly influencing the future 
development of Australia’s higher education system.  
By describing the historical development of the overseas students program’s transition 
from aid to trade, I seek to set the context in which to locate the formation of the 
overseas students’ collective action. There are two important elements I would like to 
highlight in this chapter. First is that policies and reforms implemented during the early 
years of the Colombo Plan largely constrained the political mobilisation of overseas 
students. Second is the institutional and policy changes that took place after the mid-
1970s onwards, catalysed the formation of overseas students’ collective action. The 
changing policy environment, which eventually led to the Labor government’s radical 
reforms to education aid signalled to overseas students and encouraged them to use their 
internal yet fragmented resources to form a national body in which to represent their 
concerns and oppose changes to education aid. As the tone of education aid changed in 
response to the global economic environment and mounting demand pressures on 
Australian universities, political mobilisation of overseas students became less 
constrained, precipitating growing activism during the 1970s, and widescale 
mobilisation in response to education aid reforms in the mid-1980s. In Chapter four, I 
will further elaborate on these two elements. 
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Four 
 
OPPOSING CHANGES TO THE OVERSEAS STUDENTS 
PROGRAM 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The formation of overseas student groups was a conjunctural phenomenon largely in 
response to prevailing reforms in Australia’s education aid program. Growth in numbers 
of overseas students under the Colombo Plan prompted two responses: it influenced 
local public perceptions of and curiosity about foreign students, and imposed 
considerable pressure on the capacity of the universities’ welfare support to 
accommodate a rapidly growing yet distinctive cohort. Overseas students – both 
scholarship holders and private fee paying – instinctively responded by clustering into 
groups to create an informal protective support network. As the Colombo Plan 
expanded, changing community perceptions and increasing welfare concerns helped 
proliferate the number of overseas student groups on campuses, even extending their 
social and cultural network of activities across campuses in each state. An important 
aspect to their formation was the establishment of an overseas students department 
created under the auspices of a national student body, the National Union of Australian 
Students, to serve the welfare needs of all foreign students at universities. Even with an 
increase in overseas student representation, political mobilisation of overseas students 
was still constrained, due largely to tight regulations imposed under the aid program and 
restrictions on political activities. 
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The election of a new government in 1972 brought significant changes to education aid 
policy, producing a pivotal shift that would recast overseas student activities. Students 
began to deviate from welfare concerns towards foreign policy activism. Such activism 
on issues concerning dictatorship, hegemony, third world debt and abridgement of 
human rights was publicly expressed through campaigns mostly in collaboration with 
local student activists. The national student leadership’s move to retrench welfare 
responsibilities in favour of international activism ultimately diminished the 
leadership’s relevance to overseas students in general concerned primarily about 
welfare and academic issues. Their increasing irrelevance significantly reduced the 
student leadership’s ability to mobilise an effective opposition to policy changes 
introduced in the late seventies and early eighties. In 1985 however, the Overseas 
Students Program (OSP) underwent radical changes, which catalysed a re-mobilisation 
of overseas students strongly opposed to the Government’s policy shifts from education 
aid to education trade. 
In the previous chapter I set the context by describing the historical development of the 
OSP since 1950. This chapter I explicitly seek to overlay that historical backdrop by 
examining the formation and mobilisation of overseas students during the same period. 
This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part will provide a historical overview 
of overseas student activities under the Colombo Plan and its shift in focus from social 
and welfare to foreign policy concerns. In part two I will explore government policy 
changes introduced in 1985 and the policy shifts on grassroots overseas student 
mobilisation.  
 
 
EMERGENCE OF OVERSEAS STUDENTS ORGANISATIONS 
In the early fifties, a modest influx of Colombo Plan students provoked xenophobic 
outrage within the Australian community. Reports of Asia’s growing criticism of 
Australia’s immigration policy largely influenced negative views of overseas 
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students.288 ‘Right throughout the East,’ the Daily Mirror newspaper reported ‘the 
White man is held in increasing contempt. If there is any especially good reason why 
millions should be spent educating non-Australians, then let us bring out youngsters 
from America, where we know we have friends, or from England, Italy, Greece, France, 
Malta and Germany.’289 The general community’s negativity against acceptance of 
Asian immigration had also underlined unfavourable response towards the Colombo 
Plan. In 1943, 51 percent of respondents to a Gallup Poll were against Asian 
immigration to Australia. In 1954, it grew to 61 percent.290 
In forming a defence against growing community backlash, overseas students naturally 
clustered together into social groups. Such groups acted as a support network for 
foreign students and a vehicle to counter prejudices by raising cultural awareness 
through social activities in their local community. In June 1953, Colombo Plan scholars 
in Sydney convened a meeting to establish the Colombo Plan Fellows Association. The 
association became a first attempt by scholars to establish an informal social network to 
stage ‘parties, cultural evenings, film nights, and excursions for Australian and overseas 
students.’291 While Colombo Plan scholars were promoting their activities, privately 
funded overseas students organised their own regular social events, such as festivals, 
food fairs and cultural events through nationality-based clubs like the Malaysian 
Students Association, Singapore Students Club and the Thai Students Association. 
The xenophobic reaction within the community also led to widespread debate on 
Australian campuses about the Colombo Plan students’ presence, the restrictive 
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Immigration Act (the cornerstone of the White Australia Policy) and racism in general. 
Graham Hasting suggests that campus debates had three significant effects on overseas 
students. First, it galvanised eight hundred students at the University of Sydney and 
University of New South Wales to organise large general student meetings condemning 
racism. Second, it encouraged the National Union of Australian Students (NUAUS)292, 
a body representing all tertiary students, to widen the anti-racism debate by holding a 
series of campus referenda throughout the 1950s and into the 1960s.293 NUAUS anti-
racism campaigns were bolstered by anti-White Australia organisations such as the 
Immigration Reform Group, the state based Immigration Reform Associations and 
Student Action that began to mobilise at Australian universities.294 Third, it provoked 
community groups to align with overseas students to establish the Australian Co-
ordinating Committee for Overseas Students (AOCCOS)295. AOCCOS became an 
umbrella organisation – comprising overseas students and community groups – to 
challenge racism and lessen the adjustment difficulties faced by students. AOCCOS was 
also instrumental in forming the New South Wales Overseas Student Committee, a 
student network organised to change community attitudes by publicising the positive 
aspects of Asian culture through co-ordinating and promoting Asian festivals on 
campus.296 
 
 
GROWING WELFARE CONCERNS AND STUDENTS’ RESPONSE 
By 1961, a rapidly expanding education aid program and dramatic rise in private 
overseas student numbers were beginning to place considerable pressure on 
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government’s, universities’ and even local student bodies’ capacity to respond to 
growing welfare concerns. Despite the different nationalities, overseas students’ 
academic and welfare stress such as cultural adaptation, social interaction with the local 
community, language difficulties and adapting to a different learning environment, were 
common and becoming increasingly noticeable on campus. Research and data on the 
socio-economic background of students were limited until the mid-eighties.297 In fact, 
there was little research examining welfare and education issues in the early decades of 
the overseas students program. By the seventies, research studies by Rao, Bochner, 
Brein and David had made early attempts to understand the cultural, academic, 
language and welfare challenges.298 In the eighties the volume of research expanded. 
Burke, Elkerton, Furnham, and Ballard were instrumental in highlighting concerns and 
strongly advocating an increase of welfare support services.299  
Although some generic services available to Australian students were also accessible to 
overseas students, these students were however more in need of immediate welfare 
support such as housing and employment than ‘university tutorials and career guidance 
services’.300 The NUAUS promptly responded to the pressure for support services by 
creating a national specialist department called the Overseas Students Services (OSS) 
and appointed an Overseas Students Director to handle welfare concerns of all overseas 
students in universities. Some universities did attempt to offer students separate or 
additional counselling, English language tuition and cultural adjustment support. 
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However, these services were often either insufficient or unavailable. Student 
organisations on campuses such as the Student Representative Councils (SRCs) also 
sought to address the welfare void by arranging special activities for new students. But 
activities offered were either limited or only available during orientation week at the 
beginning of each academic year.  
In response to the growing welfare gap, the NUAUS became increasingly involved in 
directing development of campus based overseas student activities. The NUAUS’s 
intervention through the OSS did help address some welfare needs and create specialist 
services specifically for overseas students. It also helped catalyse the creation of 
Overseas Student Officer positions within SRCs at most campuses to act as a go-
between for the NUAUS and the campus overseas student community.301 
 
 
OVERSEAS STUDENTS SERVICES  - EARLY YEARS 
During the early years, the OSS confined their activities to dealing with welfare 
concerns and providing up-to-date information on culture and finance. When raising 
visa matters, it regularly liaised with immigration officials and embassies on the 
students’ behalf. For example, in 1966, the OSS successfully lobbied the Department of 
Immigration for more qualified officers to deal with student visa matters and acceptance 
entries of spouses of students studying in Australia.302 
While the welfare and representational roles became the OSS’ major activities, overseas 
students themselves began forming their own clubs and societies on campuses to 
facilitate social and cultural interactions. Nationality based clubs, such as the Singapore 
Student Clubs, the Malaysian Students Associations and Thai Students Associations 
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actively organised social events and orientation support. These clubs were mostly 
financially supported or encouraged by their national governments to act as a support 
network and to help broaden campus activities for their fellow nationals. Some support 
even included creation of state and national networks. In 1960, the Thai Ambassador 
advocated and supported the establishment of a National Thai Association to create an 
opportunity for Thai students from all states to meet annually on a social basis.303 
Within a decade more campus based overseas student clubs and societies were formed 
and welfare activities became a key feature in addition to existing social and cultural 
programs. In 1964 for example, a group of overseas students from different nationalities 
at the University of Western Australia formed an Overseas Students department to have 
a representative voice within the Student Union. The department would provide a 
network for students from similar backgrounds and an opportunity to get together for 
support and social activities. Its role expanded to include education, sports and welfare 
activities and its funding came from the Student Union fees paid by overseas students. 
From the early sixties, similar bodies formed with overseas students’ associations 
established at the University of New South Wales. A decade later, Melbourne 
University created its Overseas Students Services and in 1972 Flinders University 
formed the Flinders International Students Association.  
 
 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE OVERSEAS STUDENTS SERVICES 
In late sixties and early seventies, the war in Vietnam dominated Australian politics. 
The Australian student movement expanded its welfare focus to incorporate 
international issues such as opposition towards exploitation of ‘Third world’ countries, 
debt concerns, poverty eradication and racism.304 The election of the Whitlam 
government in 1972 signalled profound changes to the overseas students program. 
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Overseas student fees were abolished and migration restrictions removed (see Chapter 
three). Shifts in government policy encouraged the OSS to expand their energies to 
focus on foreign policy enterprise. In fact, Whitlam’s substantive changes to the 
overseas students program inadvertently contributed to the radicalisation of the OSS. 
The removal of tuition fees and loosening of immigration regulations had created new 
opportunities for overseas student leaders to express themselves politically, while 
actively participating in local student movement activities. Prior to Whitlam’s policy 
changes, private overseas students were obliged to pay the full cost of their education 
and abstain from political activities. Students spent little time on extracurricular 
ventures and adhered to strict policy requirements that they complete their studies on 
time, return home or risk possible deportation. Under Whitlam’s markedly liberal policy 
arrangement, the burden of financial responsibility was removed, hindrances to 
extracurricular activities minimised, and participation in issues other than social and 
welfare concerns of overseas students broadened. 
The election of a new OSS director in 1973, T.B. Krishnan, marked a fundamental 
departure in the OSS policy. Krishnan announced the widening of the department’s 
scope from a welfare orientation to an emphasis on international and foreign policy 
issues. Krishnan boldly declared that such traditional preoccupation with immigration 
problems, student permits, counselling services, financial assistance, working permits, 
residency and financial guarantor requirements were no longer dominant.305 These 
issues ‘have tended to exhaust the energy of the overseas student movement and to 
divert the students from critically reviewing the Australian government’s policies in 
political, diplomatic, economic and social terms and from critically evaluating the 
situation in their own society’.306   
Krishnan’s transposing of overseas students’ welfare for foreign policy concerns 
reflected an already growing influence of local student radicalism over the national 
student movement in general and overseas students in particular. This policy deviation 
spilt over into the streets with increased activism and public expression on issues such 
as democratic struggles in the Asia Pacific region, South Africa, Central and South 
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America. During Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak’s visit to Australia in 
1975, the OSS played an instrumental role in organising a major protest against the 
Malaysian Government’s increasing ‘surveillance of Malaysian students’ activities’ and 
its discriminatory New Economic Policy.307 A year later a similar campaign action was 
organised to coincide with Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew’s state visit. 
By 1976, the OSS’s radical activism had reached its pinnacle, when it finally jettisoned 
its overseas students’ welfare role for anti-imperialist and national liberation policies: 
The work and orientation of the movement has progressed 
beyond a sole preoccupation with ‘student welfare’ matters, 
beyond identification of the problems and the general calls for 
human rights, to actually joining in the march towards a 
solution. That solution is the national liberation of overseas 
students by overthrowing imperialism and neo-colonial regimes 
so that the construction of a new genuine socialist society can 
begin…this has become the underlying aim of all our work.308 
By the mid to late seventies, overseas student activism had narrowed to a few campuses, 
yet its influence within the Australian Union of Students had broadened to such an 
extent that it became a base for an emerging Maoist faction. Its strong alliance with the 
Maoist faction partly contributed to a ‘convoluted power struggle’ that subsequently 
split the left within the Union.309 During the power struggle, the right wing factions in 
the Australian Union of Students had accused the OSS of sending significant amounts 
of money overseas to aid Asian national liberation movements.310 When the student 
union executive threatened to withhold funding, the OSS in return threatened to 
withdraw from the organisation. By 1980, the conflict had come to a head, with the OSS 
finally ceasing its affiliation with the Australian Union of Students; it renamed itself the 
National Overseas Student Service (NOSS), establishing a new headquarters in the 
Melbourne suburb of Fitzroy. 
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With a decline in national funding, a radical shift in policy directions, and limited 
opportunities for wider overseas student participation in the organisation, the NOSS had 
begun to slip from the core of overseas students’ representation to its periphery. This 
decline in relevance subsequently crippled any attempt at mounting an effective 
response against the Fraser government’s introduction of the Overseas Students Charge 
in 1979.311 The NOSS had in fact ‘become less and less relevant to overseas students on 
campuses throughout a major part of Australia’.312 While the NOSS focused 
predominantly on international human rights issues, campus organizations became more 
socially oriented. Peter Subramaniam explains, with the overseas students charge 
looking more likely to stay, overseas student activism began tending away from the 
political and centering more and more on the social. ‘The financial burden imposed by 
the overseas students charge served to push more overseas students than before into a 
rarefied atmosphere of academia – failure was (as it is now) costly and the number of 
overseas students who were willing to invest themselves in organisational and 
representational work fell away.’ The overseas students movement, Subramaniam 
continues, ‘receded from the mainstream of student representation and shut itself off’.313 
In 1983, from the review of the overseas student policy until the submission of the 
Goldring and Jackson reports, overseas students did little to involve themselves in the 
government’s policy process. To justify planned changes to the overseas students 
program, the Hawke Labor government actively argued that overseas students were 
limiting education access and displacing local students. Such arguments received little 
opposition, due to an absence of an organised overseas students group or an effective 
local student movement. By 1984, the importance of the NOSS had receded, while the 
Australian Union of Students imploded and collapsed. 
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POLICY CHANGE AND OVERSEAS STUDENTS RESPONSE 
In the previous section I traced the formation of overseas students clubs and societies 
during the early years of the Colombo Plan. As the Colombo Plan expanded, the 
number of overseas students groups on campus increased. As the Plan underwent 
changes under subsequent governments, the overseas students’ activities were 
transformed, increasingly focusing on international activism and to a lesser extent on 
welfare and education concerns. The decline of NOSS and the collapse of the AUS in 
1984, left a vacuum in student representation broadly, and overseas student 
representation specifically. In the next section, I will focus my attention on the period 
after the decline of NOSS and the beginning of radical changes to education aid. 
On the morning of 4 February 1985, the Australian Financial Review leaked a report 
that an independent committee established to review the Overseas Students Program 
(OSP) was favouring the introduction of full fees. The following day, the Minister for 
Education, Senator Susan Ryan denied any resolution on the future of the OSP.314 
Despite the Minister’s denial, overseas students believed that a move towards a shift in 
government policy was inevitable. Ten days later a group of overseas student leaders 
convened in Melbourne to draft a response against the impending policy changes. 
Comprising leaders from the Malaysian Law Students Association at Monash 
University, the Medical Students Society for Overseas Students at Melbourne 
University and members of the Committee of Presidents – a committee consisting of 
presidents of a number of Victorian campus overseas student associations formed in 
response to the Goldring Report – they met to embark on a campaign in expectation of 
possible fee hikes.315  
The first opportunity to respond came within weeks when news had reached the 
students that the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr Bill Hayden, was about to make a trip 
to South-East Asia in early March. The student leaders viewed his trip as a likely focus 
for some form of an indirect political intervention. On 16 February, a letter and petition 
was couriered to the Malaysian Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohammad and the 
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Opposition leader, Mr Lim Kit Siang from the Democratic Action Party (DAP) 
appealing to intervene on behalf of overseas students in Australia.316 No 
acknowledgement was forthcoming from the Prime Minister but the Malaysian 
Opposition called on the government to take some steps in preventing a fee increase. 
The lack of immediate response from the Malaysian Government convinced the 
students of the urgency of organising a group in opposition to an imminent policy 
change. Within two days, a Victorian based students coalition formed the Overseas 
Students Campaign Against Full Fees (OSCAFF). OSCAFF comprised ten affiliate 
organisations from Melbourne University, Monash University, Royal Melbourne 
Institute of Technology (RMIT), La Trobe University, Chisolm, Swinburn and 
Footscray Institutes. Its aims were clear: to prevent the current trend towards fee 
increase leading to full-cost recovery, and push for the maintenance and integrity of the 
education aid program.317 
Bill Hayden’s trip to South-East Asia attracted considerable response in Malaysia. The 
Malaysian Socialist Democratic Party (SDP) urged the Australian Government to 
seriously reconsider its intention to increase the fees for overseas students. The party 
secretary-general, Mr Fan Yew Teng, said, ‘any such drastic increase in fees could well 
jeopardise the educational and professional prospect of thousands of young 
Malaysians.’318 On the same day, Malaysia’s Education Minister, Abdullah Badawi, 
informed Mr Hayden that the Malaysians were not impressed with the fee increase. 
According to Abdullah, Prime Minister Dr Mahathir felt that Australia should back up 
its rhetoric about wanting to find a place in the South-East Asian region with ‘hard-
nosed and realistic contribution.’319 The Malaysian Government viewed subsidised 
education, particularly at the tertiary level, as ‘an example of the sort of thing, Australia 
could, and should do’320. The Opposition however considered that the Malaysian 
Education Minister’s statement lacked the strong response previously served to the 
British over a similar fee hike five years earlier. The Thatcher government’s full fee 
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initiative had in fact led to strident Malaysian protest provoking among other responses, 
a ‘Buy British last’ policy. Such attempts may not have succeeded in reversing the 
British full fee policy, they did however force the British Government to increase the 
number of scholarships places as a concession.321 
Two factors largely contributed to the Malaysian Government’s lack of public protest 
against Australia’s fee rise. First, unlike the British fee hikes, the Australian fee 
increases had less of a direct financial impact on the Malaysian Government coffers. A 
significant portion of Malaysian Government scholarship funds mainly targeted ethnic 
Malay students, the main beneficiaries of the New Economic Policy (NEP). Under such 
schemes, Malay students chose the United Kingdom or the United States as destination 
of choice for their undergraduate and postgraduate studies. For example, during the 
mid-eighties approximately 20 percent of the total number of Malaysians studying in 
Australia were ethnic Malays having preferential access to Home Government Students 
(HGS).322 Non-Malay students who could not afford the United Kingdom or the United 
States option chose Australia as an affordable alternative.323 
Second, in 1983 the Australian Government imposed a quota of 1500 on private 
overseas students’ enrolment to tertiary institutions. The quota had a significant effect 
on Malaysians, particularly limiting opportunities for tertiary studies in Australia. In 
fact, Malaysia, the Australian Financial Review reported, was getting ‘stroppy about 
quotas placed in the way of Malaysian students’ and was calling for the Australian 
Government to liberalise its tertiary places, allowing more student access to its higher 
education system.324 
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RISING OPPOSITION AGAINST POLICY REFORM 
On 22 March 1985, the Minister for Education, Senator Susan Ryan, announced 
preliminary yet radical changes to the overseas students program. Key elements of the 
change involved: imposing a limit on the number of overseas students admitted into 
secondary and tertiary institutions; substantially increasing the course fees by 35 
percent for students enrolled in the 1985/86 academic years and by 45 percent in 
subsequent years; and allowing the higher education sector to recruit students and offer 
places at full-cost fees.325 
A day after the Minister’s announcement, overseas students across Australia acted.  
Public meetings, rallies and petition drives were organised. In Victoria, OSCAFF 
launched the ‘Dear Mr Hawke’ campaign to send a thousand signed letters to the Prime 
Minister and the Minister for Education.326 The petition called on the government to ‘re-
affirm its commitment to its policy that supports the social and economic development 
of developing countries through access to Australia’s education and training resources.’ 
It also asked for the formulation of a ‘consistent and considerate policy concerning 
overseas students’ and to ‘reconsider as a matter of urgency the legislation of such a 
high increase in visa charges.’327 
In New South Wales the overseas students declared 2 April Black Tuesday – a day to 
mourn the death of education. Steven Gan, spokesperson at the University of New 
South Wales, protested that ‘the moves to reintroduce fees for all students and impose 
full-cost fees for overseas students would mark the end of free education in Australia 
and signal the demise of the aid component in the OSP’.328 To demonstrate their strong 
public opposition, the overseas students along with their local student counterparts, 
conducted a mock funeral procession donning black bans in protest.329 The mock 
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funeral was to symbolise the ‘death of the Overseas Students Program as the most 
effective form of foreign aid.’330 
Around Australia, other campus based overseas student organisations, in alliance with 
their local student communities, campaigned publicly against the fee changes. Along 
with the public campaign, organisations in Victoria, South Australia and New South 
Wales conducted research into the impact of policy change on overseas students. 
OSCAFF commissioned the Department of Statistics at the University of Melbourne to 
undertake a state-wide survey of overseas students. In South Australia, the students 
conducted a financial survey of overseas students to determine the likely impact of fee 
increases. In New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory, the students 
coordinated a survey to examine the impact of policy change on private overseas 
students.331  
As momentum against the fee policy gathered, segments of the public voiced their 
support for the overseas students’ campaign. The support was largely driven by fears 
that full fee policy would eventually affect local students. The University of Sydney’s 
Student Representative Council (SRC) declared its opposition to the policy arguing that 
the introduction of tuition fees for overseas students was a prelude to fees for local 
students. Student organiser, Adam Rorris, argued: 
The present Overseas Students Program that requires overseas 
students to pay a high level of fees is unjust and discriminatory.  
We could not preserve a genuine free education system if a 
group of students are forced to pay for their education.  We 
believe that the overseas students fee is a first step towards 
tuition fees for all students.332 
Wider community support against the ‘marketisation of higher education’ grew. The 
Higher Education Round Table (HERT), a group of staff associations representing some 
200 000 academics, teachers and postgraduates, also expressed some concerns. They 
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argued that the policy move to export higher education might be a ‘back-door’ means of 
reducing the total level of aid that the government presently gave to South-East Asian 
countries in the form of subsidised tertiary education.333 Such moves would also ‘put 
pressure on the provision of free higher education for Australian students and eventually 
lead to some form of fees being introduced.’334  
 
 
AN ATTEMPT AT NATIONAL MOBILISATION 
After the policy announcement, overseas students across Australia began to recognise 
that their disparate campaigns were having little impact on influencing any changes. 
The need to coordinate a national response, share limited resources and establish an 
information channel had grown. By May, a national overseas students network was 
taking shape. In New South Wales, a group of students met to establish a state based 
organisation, the NSW Overseas Students Collective (NSWOSC). Victoria and New 
South Wales became the principal leaders in the opposition to the government’s OSP 
changes, since these states had the majority of enrolled overseas students and tertiary 
institutions. While NSWOSC prepared to host an inaugural national overseas students 
conference in Sydney that would draw together the different campaigns around the 
country, OSCAFF was in the advanced stages of developing a draft proposal 
recommending the creation of a national umbrella body to represent the views of all 
overseas students in Australia. The proposal outlined the main problems facing the 
overseas students’ campaign: the low grassroots support, student apathy, lack of 
financial resources and limited political skills.335 The new body would resolve the 
problems by coordinating national anti-fees campaigns; drawing together the various 
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campaign groups; creating information linkages; sharing resources and presenting a 
unified voice on the fee charges.336  
From 13 to 17 May 1985, overseas student leaders across Australia met for the 
inaugural national conference, held at the University of New South Wales. It was the 
first time overseas student representatives from across the country had met to discuss 
changes to government policy. Unfortunately, the diverging views that emerged on key 
issues would fracture the unity of this fledgling opposition, threatening to end 
prematurely a national coherent response. The conference in fact failed due to emerging 
tensions between two groups with contrasting policy views, different campaign styles 
and distinctive philosophical leanings.337  
Contrasting policy views: During the inaugural conference, the NSW faction vigorously 
opposed the government’s fees hike. They pressed the delegates to campaign against the 
OSC and push for the total ‘abolition’ of the fees as an immediate action. The principles 
of education as a public good, they trenchantly maintained, ‘should not be traded in the 
market place and it was the moral responsibility of Australia to provide educational aid 
to developing countries in the region.338 ‘To abolish tuition fees’, they argued, would 
help ‘promote more equitable participation of underprivileged overseas students from 
the third world countries.’339 
The opposing faction, led by a coalition comprising campuses in Victoria, South 
Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania, represented a less confrontational 
alternative to the ‘abolitionist’ view. The majority of this faction’s student leaders were 
also Malaysians, but were studying in older, more traditional institutions such as the 
University of Melbourne and the University of Adelaide, where student activism was 
less robust.340 The coalition advocated instead a freeze in fees for current students, 
believing that such a ‘moderate’ and ‘pragmatic’ response to fees would be achievable 
in contrast to the ‘abolitionist’ position. The ‘pro-freeze’ camp in fact viewed the 
alternative position as ‘unsustainable’ and an ‘idealistic’ riposte to government policy at 
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a time when tertiary fees for all students were actually being contemplated. Such 
idealism would have little influence in significantly shifting government policy in the 
short-term. By advocating for ‘freeze’ in fees instead of the more radical anti-fees 
campaign, the ‘pro-freeze’ faction wanted to minimise the adverse impact of fee 
increases on currently enrolled overseas students. The ‘pro-freeze’ group advocated a 
campaign that worked towards achieving ‘something concrete and obtainable in the 
shortest time’.341 Raj Kanan argued: 
…are we prepared to ignore the students who are facing the 
hardship of the 1986 charge of $3,500, and proceed with a 
campaign that is based purely on idealistic assertions which will 
take a long time and a lot of effort to achieve. If we agree that 
the abolition of OSC is a long-term process, then shouldn’t we 
address the immediate issue that is to ensure that the students, 
who are here, are not deported for failing to meet the increase? 
…if something is not achieved in the short term than this will 
lead to a point where overseas students lose hope on the entire 
system or the campaign.342   
 
Different campaign styles and distinctive philosophical leanings: One faction 
comprised a majority of campuses in New South Wales under the leadership of the 
NSWOSC. Dominated by Malaysian students who formed the majority intake of all 
private overseas students in Australia, studying mainly at the University of New South 
Wales (UNSW), and University of Technology Sydney (UTS), the faction advocated a 
confrontational style of campaign that relied on developing close alliances with local 
student organisations within a wider opposition to tuition fees. Their activism is indeed 
not surprising since UNSW and UTS, both established in the sixties, were considered 
historically more progressive than the older institutions. In fact, during the seventies, 
both institutions formed the backbone of the National Overseas Students Services 
(NOSS), a division created with the Australian Union of Students in 1961 to represent 
the concerns of overseas students. Under their influence, the NOSS gradually shifted its 
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focus from welfare concerns to foreign policy issues.343 This shift, as argued earlier, not 
only diminished its relevance but also significantly contributed to the organisation’s 
demise by the mid-eighties.344 
Despite the fracture in the overseas students’ response, a number of key resolutions 
were passed, not as a compromise or due to the logic of a particular argument, but due 
to the fact that the ‘pro-freeze’ votes at the conference were much larger than the 
‘abolitionist’ votes. In fact, the fracture in the fledgling movement remained clearly 
delineated across two distinct factions, pro-freeze and abolitionist.  
Relying on a conference dominated by the pro-freeze faction, the conference swiftly 
passed five motions. First, it called on the Australian Federal Government to freeze the 
overseas students charge at the 1984/85 levels. Second, it called for the immediate re-
evaluation of the overseas students program (OSP), including the total removal of the 
overseas students charge. Third, it called on the government to employ financial 
incentives or any other mechanisms to implement its new policy of 10 percent 
institutional quota for overseas students. Fourth, it called on the government to institute 
its new policy to impose 20 percent faculty quotas for overseas students in all 
institutions of higher learning. Finally, it called on home governments of overseas 
students in Australia to adopt all positive measures in support of the campaign against 
fee increases.345 Having a significant majority of Malaysian students, the conference 
singled out the Malaysian Government for particular aid.346 
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OPPOSING THE OVERSEAS STUDENTS CHARGES 
On 22 May 1985, five student representatives from the NSWOSC met with the Minister 
of Education, Senator Susan Ryan, at her Parliament House office in Canberra. The 
students raised their concerns about the increase in visa charges, the discriminatory sub-
quotas, and racism directed at overseas students on campus. The meeting achieved little 
in securing any concessions, only leaving the students ‘feeling that they had not come 
any closer to resolving the many problems faced by overseas students’.347 The Minister 
had in fact informed them that ‘there was no room for compromise’ and the ‘overseas 
student fees were here to stay.’348 
Within a month of the visit, the Minister unveiled further details of the planned changes 
to the OSP. The new policy would maintain the 1985 level of overseas student intake 
and allow in 1986 a maximum of 3500 new private students to commence studies – 
admitting 2000 to secondary schools and 1500 to tertiary institutions. By maintaining 
the 1985 intake level, the government also allowed itself more time to prepare the 
groundwork to introduce the legislative changes – the Overseas Students Charge 
Amendment Bill 1985 – while controlling the growing pressure imposed on universities 
by an increased overseas demand for limited tertiary places. 
In response to the Minister’s policy, the students began accelerating their plans to 
conduct a major public campaign and prepare for a lobby trip to Canberra to oppose the 
legislative changes. From 15 to 19 July 1986, a National Mobilisation Week was 
organised across Australia. The week-long campaign involved a petition drive; 
compiling case histories of students with genuine financial difficulties; writing letters of 
protest to the media, State and Federal Parliament members; and organising 
multicultural social events on campus to help raise awareness and disseminate 
information to students.349 
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Accompanying the national campaign, OSCAFF began preparation to send a delegation 
to Canberra to lobby against the government’s amendment. The lobby trip would 
involve meeting with politicians from the Australian Democrats, Labor and Liberal 
parties. As they prepared for their trip, news had reached the students that the Liberals 
would vote with the Democrats to block the fees Bill in the Senate. The good news 
served as a much added impetus to the group. 
Meanwhile, another OSCAFF delegation departed for Malaysia to meet with the Deputy 
Education Minister, Datuk Ling Liong Sik, the Minister for Transport, Datuk Samy 
Velu, members of the social reform group ALIRAN,350 and the Malaysian Trade Union 
Congress. The OSCAFF lobby sought the support of the ministers, non-government 
organisations and unions to oppose the fee policy. The students claimed that while the 
‘present (Overseas Students Charge) scheme is already a source of great financial 
hardship to Malaysian students, any further increase, much less full-cost recovery, 
would be disastrous.’351 
It is interesting to note however that the students only met with non-Malay ethnic 
leaders from the national coalition front – the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) 
and the Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) – a human rights media organisation and a 
non-Malay labour union. The majority of Malaysian students affected by fee rises were 
non-Malays (Chinese and Indians) who were not beneficiaries of Malaysian 
Government scholarships which mainly targeted ‘Bumiputra’352 Malays, which 
preferential treatment under the the Government’s New Economic Policy (NEP).353 
Since the Australian Government’s announcement regarding raising the OSC and 
introducing full fee courses, the Malaysian Government had given little support to the 
students’ opposition campaign. By meeting with the MCA and MIC, the students hoped 
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the ethnic based parties would indirectly influence the Malay dominated government to 
respond strongly against fee increases that directly affected their ethnic communities. 
By lobbying a human rights organisation and a labour union, the students hoped that 
these organisations would help increase pressure of the government to respond to fee 
increases. OSCAFF’s lobby trip to Malaysia did attract the desired support from the 
Malaysian Trade Union Congress, which publicly criticised the Australian 
Government’s decision to increase fees.354 
While the lobby trips and media attention were beginning to raise the plight of the 
students, there were however emerging concerns by some Malaysian members of 
OSCAFF’s leadership team. The Malaysian students were becoming deeply concerned 
that the Malaysian Government would misconstrue their strong opposition towards the 
Australian Government as ‘undesirable’ political activities, attracting reprisal when they 
returned home. The students particularly feared that their critical opposition of the 
Australian Government would adversely affect their campaign and discourage more 
Malaysian students from vocally opposing the fee charges.355 To ease their fears, they 
met with the Malaysian High Commissioner in Melbourne to obtain some assurance 
about their public campaigns. The High Commissioner assured the leaders that the 
Malaysian Government would not consider the students’ protest anti-national as long as 
they kept within the Australian legal limits.356 
On 21 August 1985, the government introduced into the lower house the Bill for an Act 
to amend the Overseas Students Charge Act 1979. The Bill proposed to raise the 
overseas student charges for current and future students by 35 percent for the 1985/86 
academic year and 40 percent for the 1986/87 period. It also proposed to set the upper 
ceiling for the overseas students quota at all tertiary institutions and courses. 
On 7 October, a delegation of fourteen student representatives departed for Canberra 
armed with results from the survey research, case histories and letters of support.357 The 
                                                
354 1985, MTUC raps Aussies for raising fees, New Straits Times, Malaysia, 24 March 
355 About eleven out of the 14 members of OSCAFF lobby trip to Canberra on 7 – 11 October were 
Malaysians – OSCAFF Campaign 1985, End of year report, (unpublished) 
356 OSCAFF Activities Report (1985 – 1986), Melbourne, (unpublished) 
357 The lobby team was composed of eleven overseas students and three members of the National Union 
of Students.  The delegation included Ng Kong Peng and S. Subramaniam from Monash University; Raj 
 121 
student lobby would attempt to convince the government of the impact of the fee 
increase on the welfare of overseas students, especially for students enrolled before 1 
January 1986. Understanding the importance of securing the support of the Opposition 
parties to defeat the Bill, the students also invested considerable effort in lobbying the 
Opposition into a more vocal position against the amendment Bill. At the start of their 
lobby trip, the students met with Democrats, Senator Janine Haines and an advisor to 
Senator Macklin, to consolidate the support they had already received from the 
Democrats.358 In fact, it was less than five months before when the leader of the 
Democrats, Senator Don Chipp wrote a letter in strong support of the students’ cause:  
The Australian Democrats oppose the recent increases in 
overseas students charges. We believe that the provision of 
places in our universities for overseas students should be seen 
as part of our overseas aid effort and that the government 
should face up to its moral obligations in this area. Places 
provided for overseas students should be additional to those 
provided to local students, and should not be seen as placing 
local students at a disadvantage by competing for those places. 
We further believe that if fees for overseas students are to be 
charged, then the level of those fees should be set in relation to 
the income in the students’ home country.359  
After the July National Mobilisation Week campaign, the student leaders had not only 
continued to stay in close contact with Senator Chipp’s office, they were in fact 
regularly kept updated by his office about developments in Parliament. Even before the 
delegation departed for Canberra, the students met with Senator Don Chipp again to 
discuss suitable strategies in Parliament.  
During their Canberra lobby trip, the students met with various members of 
government, including the Federal Australian Labor Party (ALP) Caucus Education 
Committee; the Ministers of Education, Trade, Industry, Finance, Social Security, 
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Science and Foreign Affairs; and the office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Recognising the importance of Caucus support to the ALP, the delegation also lobbied 
the back benchers in the House of Representatives and the Senate.  
At the meetings, the students strongly argued that the fee increases, especially if it 
became retrospective, would have an adverse impact on students, particularly those 
enrolled before 1 January 1986. To substantiate their claims, they presented the results 
of their Victorian survey conducted by the Department of Statistics at the University of 
Melbourne. The survey gauged the likely effects the government’s fee increase on 
current and future overseas student. It revealed that 246 out of 270 respondents would 
consider ‘terminating their studies or increasing paid work’.360 The results showed 
similarities with the New South Wales Overseas Students Collective (NSWOSC) survey 
conducted in the Australian Capital Territory and New South Wales. The NSWOSC 
study showed that 43 percent of enrolled overseas students would not be able to 
complete their studies or would be forced to transfer their studies to another country.361 
To add to their claims, the delegation also presented a dossier containing 150 case 
studies of students who would be forced to discontinue their courses if the fee increase 
became retrospective. 
In lobbying the Liberal Opposition party into a more vocal position on the amendment, 
the students met with Opposition back benchers from both houses. They found 
particularly strong support from the Liberal Party’s Shadow Minister for Education, the 
Hon. Peter Shack. The Hon. Peter Shack was convinced that the Australian Government 
had already entered into a ‘tacit agreement with students already enrolled as to the level 
of the Overseas Student Charge (OSC)’.362  This view received broad backing from the 
Opposition.363 
For three days, they lobbied hard for changes to the Bill: ‘We would normally start up 
at 8.00 am and be in the House until around 9.00 at night. It was indeed three whole 
days of constant lobbying, developing new arguments, realising the problems with old 
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arguments and adjusting the approach depending on whom we were speaking to.’364 On 
the third day of the lobby trip, the students received news of a proposal circulating 
within the ALP Caucus Education Committee, proposing an amendment to Cabinet 
calling for a ‘significant compromise’ to protect students enrolled prior to 1 January 
1986. 
By the end of the trip, students believed that their campaign had made some progress. A 
week after their return, the President of OSCAFF, Peter Subramaniam, received 
information from the Democrats’ head office informing him that the government was 
floating a 15 percent increase instead of the 35 percent for students enrolled prior to 1 
January 1986. Peter Subramaniam called an emergency OSCAFF executive meeting to 
consider the proposed compromise. The meeting agreed that the compromise did not 
adequately respond to the problems that the OSC Amendment Bill 1985 was creating.365 
Further ‘the 15 percent did not represent an indexed or regulated increase and thus was 
unacceptable.’366 The students relayed their objection to the Democrats and Opposition 
Liberal parties. Both the Opposition and the Democrats shared the view and the 
Democrats submitted an amendment for a freeze in fees. 
 
 
DEPORTATION OF AHMAD RAZANI OTHMAN 
On Tuesday 15 October, news of the arrest and planned deportation of a Malaysian 
student, Mr Ahmad Razani Othman, reached OSCAFF and NSWOSC. The 22 year old 
economics student from the University of New England was arrested two weeks before 
his final exams and detained at the Westbridge migrant detention centre for failing to 
pay his tuition fees.367 Within ten days, the Department of Immigration had deported Mr 
Ahmad, claiming that Mr Ahmad eventually ‘made the right decision in voluntarily 
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leaving Australia’.368 The deportation of Mr Ahmad represented the first case of an 
overseas student forced to leave Australia for failing to pay his annual tuition fees.  
The deportation of Mr Ahmad attracted considerable publicity and opposition. OSCAFF 
immediately responded by telexing the relevant Ministers of Cabinet appealing for 
leniency in cases of genuine financial difficulty. The ASEAN (Association for South-
East Asian Nations) Teachers Organisations made representations to the Australian 
Teachers Federation seeking support to oppose the deportation by the government. The 
President of the Australian Teachers Federation (ATF), Jennie George, registered 
ATF’s ‘strongest protest’ at the overseas student’s arrest and subsequent deportation, 
describing it as ‘overt heavy-handedness – with no obvious publicly understood 
mechanisms for appeals procedures on humanitarian and hardship grounds for these 
young people.’369 
We object strongly being put into a position vis a vis our own 
extensive connections and positive relations in the Asian – 
Pacific region, to have to justify what in our view are totally 
inadequate procedures and processes, on this issue. 370 
About 20 members of the NSWOSC staged a protest outside the Polish Club at 
Ashfield, Sydney, where the Immigration Minister, Mr Hurford, was attending a 
meeting.371 The NSWOSC claimed that on 27 September the Department of Education 
had in fact given guarantees that no overseas students would be deported without being 
given a chance to put their case forward. Further, the students accused the Federal 
Government of ignoring the Malaysian Consulate’s and various academic unions’ call 
for an inquiry into Mr Ahmad’s case and for intimidating him into leaving Australia 
against his will. In a letter written and signed by Mr Ahmad at the detention centre and 
witnessed by NSWOSC members, Mr Peng Hai Long and Mr Steven Gan, Ahmad 
claimed: 
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My decision to consent to deportation was made under strong 
intimidation from officers of the Immigration dept.  I have been 
interviewed a number of times by these officers, and on each 
occasion was told repeatedly that if I did not voluntarily leave 
this country, I would be deported therefore not be permitted re-
entry to Australia until 1990. This would greatly jeopardize any 
opportunities I might have to complete my studies.372 
An anti-racism group representing 30 trade unions attacked the State and Federal 
Governments for threatening to deport overseas students unable to pay increased 
overseas fees.373 The secretary of the Combined Unions Against Racism, Mr Barry 
Cotter, claimed 15 students were being threatened with deportation just as they were 
about to sit final exams.374 Mr Cotter called on the Federal Minister for Immigration, 
Mr Hurford, the NSW Attorney-General, Mr Sheehan, and the Minister for Police, Mr 
Anderson, to ‘drop any proposed action against the students.’ 375 
After considerable pressure, Senator Susan Ryan partly relented, allowing Mr Ahmad to 
complete his degree in Malaysia:  
Government policy is that private overseas students, as with 
government supported Australian students, should maintain 
reasonable academic progress if they wish to retain government 
support. Because the student's poor record had been due to 
financial worries and because his most recent academic work in 
the Bachelor of Economics course had shown promise of 
improvement, his case was re-examined by my Department. My 
Department has taken up with the University the possibility of 
the student being allowed to sit for his end of year examinations 
in his own country.376   
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OPPOSING THE OVERSEAS STUDENTS CHARGE: SECOND ATTEMPT 
From October to November 1985, the student leadership took a break from their 
campaigns to prepare for their exams. On 19 November, two OSCAFF representatives, 
Mr Peter Subramaniam and Mr Ooi Kheng Boon, left for Canberra when they were 
informed that Parliament would debate the OSC amendment. Apart from meeting 
members from both Government and Opposition, the students met with the Private 
Secretary to the Minister for Education to discuss at length several issues, including the 
reasons why the Minister could not accept the Democrats’ ‘fees freeze’ amendment to 
the Bill. Immediately after the discussion, both met with a ‘helpful Liberal’ who 
indicated to them that approaches had already been made to the Liberal shadow minister 
involved.377 At 10.00 pm, the same night, the students met with the Liberal 
spokesperson on Education, Hon. Peter Shack. At this meeting, they learnt that the 
Coalition had agreed to the Government’s amendment of a 15 per cent charge for 
students enrolled before 1 January 1986. Both student leaders expressed ‘great doubts 
as to whether a 15 percent increase was actually going to address the injustice to the 
students already enrolled.’378   
On the morning of the second reading, the representatives met again with Hon. Peter 
Shack, to be informed that the Coalition had accepted some doubts expressed by the 
students. Mr Shack agreed with the arguments expressed by the students and gave them 
the assurance that the Coalition would not support the proposed 15 percent increase.  
At 5.30 pm on 20 November, the House of Representatives debated the Overseas 
Student Charge Amendment Bill 1985. In a speech to the House, Mr Peter Shack 
expressed reservations about the amendments, arguing that they would produce 
‘substantially and unexpectedly higher costs to overseas students who are already in 
tertiary courses in Australia.’379 Even Australian Labor Party back bencher, Mr Peter 
Milton, member for La Trobe, backed the Coalition argument, expressing his concern 
about the effect of the increased fees and proposing instead a three-year fixed period for 
student charges to ensure at least ‘elements of stability and certainty’ in the program. 
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Milton’s view was in stark contrast to the government’s, largely due to his discussion 
with the student leaders: 
I must admit to being a convert to these views as a result of the 
many letters I have received and talks I have had with 
representatives of the various students' organisations around 
Australia. 380 
Having control of the Lower House, the amendment of a 15 percent increase on 
students enrolled before 1 January 1986 passed comfortably through to the Senate. The 
Coalition however kept its word and voted against the Bill. 
Five days after the debate, the President of OSCAFF, Peter Subramaniam, received a 
telephone call from Senator Peter Baume, the Liberal spokesperson on Education in the 
Senate, informing him that a separate Liberal amendment – a compromise between the 
Democrats’ freeze in real money terms and the government’s unconditional 15 percent 
increase – would likely be accepted by the government. The compromise would involve 
setting the charge to reflect the rate of inflation, effectively imposing an increase of up 
to 15 percent on students enrolled before 1 January 1986. The Government accepted the 
amendment and on the night of 28 November, the Senate passed the Overseas Student 
Charge Amendment Bill 1985. 
Even though the compromise did not truly reflect the students’ ultimate aim of halting 
the fee increase, it did represent a major concession by the government in response to 
the students’ campaigns. After their modest success, the students were determined to 
bolster their opposition to future policy changes. On May 1986, the second national 
conference of overseas students established the National Liaison Committee for 
Overseas Students in Australia (NLC). The new body would represent all overseas 
students in the country. The NLC would play a significant role in contributing to the 
development of Australia’s Export Education Services Sector in subsequent years. 
 
 
                                                
380 ibid 
 128 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter forms the basis of understanding the emergence of an overseas student 
collective action against government education aid reforms. In this chapter I have 
attempted to trace the formation of overseas students’ organisations during the early 
years of the Colombo Plan. As the Plan expanded, overseas students extended their 
social activities to incorporate welfare concerns. Its evolution led to creation of a 
national overseas students service incorporated within a larger student body to serve the 
welfare needs of students studying in universities. Under a markedly liberal policy 
regime, the students’ focus in the seventies shifted to emphasise international activism. 
Such diversion from their original mandate subsequently marginalised a significant 
portion of their constituents, handicapping their ability to mobilise effective support to 
oppose policy changes. The government’s policy announcement in 1985 catalysed a 
new grassroots response to the proposed changes and within two months overseas 
students across the country convened a national conference and mooted the creation of a 
national representative body.  It was envisaged that such a body would help bridge the 
geographical distances, facilitate interstate communications and coordinate national 
campaigns. However, that attempt to mobilise failed, with the gathered student leaders 
unable to agree on a unified policy response. Meanwhile, students continued their 
fragmented push to stop the Overseas Students Amendment Bill being introduced in 
Parliament. During their lobby trip to Canberra, they realised their first attempt would 
not succeed. In response, they adapted their arguments, formulated new arguments and 
changed their lobby strategies to push for an amendment to the bill.  Their ‘Campaign 
1985’ did yield three important successes. First, it managed to reduce the government’s 
proposed 35 percent charges to instead reflect the current rate of inflation. Second, they 
found a meaningful resolution to the deportation of the Malaysian student, Ahmed 
Othman. Third, the success added the necessary impetus to push once again for a 
national coordinating committee.  
This chapter seeks to explain how institutionalised politics broadly and public policy 
specifically within the national context shaped the formation of overseas students’ 
collective action. Four key observations can be drawn from this chapter. First, overseas 
student political mobilisation, under the Colombo Plan, was constrained by the 
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program’s emphasis of the Australian Government and Australian cultural attitudes. 
However, shifting institutional structures and policies from the 1970s onwards, which 
were driven largely by economic factors, played a significant role in expanding political 
opportunities for overseas student mobilisation. By 1985, the easing of government 
constraints had allowed a ‘fresh’ mobilisation of grassroots overseas students. Second, 
the leaked report favouring the introduction of full fees signalled the beginning of a 
forming overseas students’ action. Overseas students clubs and societies spawned 
during the early development of education aid coupled with the Australian Students 
Union’s active promotion of campus based overseas student representation, were crucial 
in creating an environment of a loose network of campus overseas student bodies that 
subsequently coalesced in response to a common policy threat. The loose connective 
network of campus based overseas student clubs was an important element in 
mobilising a collective action. 
Third, the formation of a coalition of overseas students grouping actively opposed 
government reforms by adopting action repertoires of movements and forming alliances 
with local students. In alliance with local students, the overseas students used petition 
drives, lobby trips, public rallies and the symbolism of a mock funeral procession to 
raise the public profile of their issues and attract support. Finally, during the emergent 
phase, the overseas students began to mobilise structures and resources to underpin their 
opposition. The shift from an informal loose network towards developing a formal 
structure of ‘sufficient strength’ was their attempt at seizing opportunities for action.  
If changes in education aid policy shaped the prospects and form of overseas students’ 
collective actions, then mobilising structures influenced the way in which the students 
sought to organise. The next chapter will examine the overseas students’ attempt to shift 
from an informal network opposing government policy to a formal collective structure 
through which to mobilise and engage in collective action. In Chapter five, I will 
examine the students’ push to establish a national coordinating body, the National 
Liaison Committee for Overseas Students in Australia (NLC). 
 
 
 
